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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the debate concerning corporate governance centers
on the American Law Institute's proposed Principles of Corporate
Governance [hereinafter ALI Proposals or ALI Principles].' The
*This Special Project Note is cited as "ALI Proposals (Special Project)" throughout
the Special Project.
1. Currently, the American Law Institute's Proposals consist of six tentative drafts
and one discussion draft. These drafts include PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, Apr. 1, 1982) [herein-
after T.D. No. 1] [definitions (Part I), objectives (Part II), structure of the corporation (Part
III), duty of care and the business judgment rule (Part IV), and derivative actions (Part
VII)1; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Discussion
Draft No. 1, June 3, 1985) [hereinafter Discussion Draft No. 1]; PRINCIPLES OP CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 2, Apr. 13, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter T.D. No. 2] [revision of Parts I, II & III]; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALY-
SIS AND RECOMMDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 3, Apr. 13, 1984) [hereinafter T.D. No. 3] [duty of
loyalty (Part V) and revision of Part IV]; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUC-
TURE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 12, 1985) [hereinafter T.D.
No. 4] [revision of Part IV]; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 5, Apr. 15, 1986) [hereinafter T.D. No. 5] [revision of Parts I,
V & VI]; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent.
Draft No. 6, Oct. 10, 1986) [hereinafter T.D. No. 6] [revision of Part VII].
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American Law Institute2 originally intended the ALI Proposals to
"restate" the law of corporate governance without departing from
the primary goal stated in the ALI's charter: "to promote the clari-
fication and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to
social needs."' The ALI Proposals, however, have evolved into a
"new art form"' and, unlike a restatement, have proposed reforms
in addition to codifying the common law.5 Because of the predomi-
nance of statutory corporation law, the ALI Proposals have focused
2. The American Law Institute began with the formation of the Committee on the
Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the
Establishment of an American Law Institute [hereinafter the Committee]. The Committee's
members included such renowned legal scholars as Benjamin Cardozo, Arthur Corbin,
Learned Hand, Harlan Stone, John Wigmore, and Samuel Williston. On February 23, 1923,
the Committee published a report which asserted that American law was becoming increas-
ingly uncertain and complex. Consequently, the Committee proposed the establishment of a
"Restatement of the Law." The American Law Institute (ALI) was founded and organized
for this purpose. The ALI has produced numerous restatements of the common law in such
areas as torts, property, and contracts. The ALI also joined the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in drafting the Uniform Commercial Code. See generally The American Law
Institute, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY (1973).
3. See Eisenberg, An Introduction to The American Law Institute's Corporate Gov-
ernance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495 (1984) (quoting Perkins, The President's Letter,
A.L.I. REP. 1 (1982)). Traditionally, the ALI has undertaken to restate the common law. As
early as 1923, William Draper Lewis, the first president of the ALI, advanced the idea of a
corporation law project. His efforts spurred a debate within the ALI regarding the feasibility
of restating a body of law so largely statutory. In 1977-78 the ALI-ABA Committee and the
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association held
four regional conferences, thus beginning the ALl Principles. The ALl commissioned the
Principles in 1978 and appointed the late Ray Garrett, Jr. as Chief Reporter. Stanley
Kaplan is the present Chief Reporter. The ALI-ABA Symposiums are documented in COM-
MENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter
COMMENTARIES].
4. While discussing the structure of the Corporate Governance Proposals, Professor
Louis Loss stated in his final remarks to the ALI-ABA Symposium:
I'm not sure that I would put it in terms of a creative restatement, but a new art form.
I don't think it could be just like the traditional restatement because, as the people in
the American Law Institute concluded long before my time, it was not appropriate to
try to restate the common law of corporations because so much of it has been made the
basis of statutory law. . . . In short, the new art form that I would hope would evolve
would be a combination of classic restatement, forward looking guidelines, and perhaps
also model provisions-without having a model code.
Loss, Concluding Remarks, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at 554-55; see Schwartz, Feder-
alism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 582-84 (1984).
5. In fact, while the first draft was entitled "Restatement and Recommendations," the
subsequent six drafts are entitled "Analysis and Recommendations." The first draft clearly
distinguished its black letter law proposals (which begin with "corporate law should provide
that. . . .") from its suggested proposals (which begin with "as a matter of good corporate
practice, a corporation should .... "). Introductory Note, T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, at xxi-
xxii. The subsequent drafts make no such separations in their text but set forth the recom-
mendations alongside the black letter law. See Goldstein, Future Articulation of Corpora-
tion Law, 39 Bus. LAW. 1541 (1984).
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selectively on those areas that usually are governed by common
law. The ALI Proposals have seven parts: (1) Definitions; (2)
Objectives and Conduct of the Business Corporation; (3) Structure
of the Corporation; (4) Duty of Care and the Business Judgment
Rule; (5) Duty of Loyalty; (6) Transactions in Control; and (7)
Remedies.'
II. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE
Criticism of the ALI Proposals has been harsh and varied.7 In
order to understand this vehement reaction, the historical corpo-
rate governance debate must be analyzed.8 This debate began in
1932 when Adolph Berle, professor of law, and Gardiner Means,
professor of economics,9 suggested that the expanding shareholder
constituencies of large, publicly held corporations presented man-
agers with the opportunity to usurp control of their corporations.'0
6. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 498.
7. See, e.g., STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE. RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS" (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter Roundtable Statement]; COMMENTS OF THE
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE CONCERNING THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PROJECT (May 1984) [hereinafter Roundtable Comments]; Branson, Countertrends in Cor-
poration Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Reform,
and Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1983); Fischel,
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1260 (1982); Hansen, The
ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment
Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LAW. 1237 (1986); Scott, Corporation Law and the American
Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 930 (1983); Weiss, Eco-
nomic Analysis, Corporate Law and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1984).
8. See generally Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation
Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557 (1984).
9. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932). This work has been widely hailed as the cause of the corporate governance debate.
John Kenneth Galbraith called it "one of the two most important books of the 1930's."
Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J.L. & ECON.
273, 273 (1983) (quoting Galbraith, Book Review, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1527 (1968)).
10. Oliver Williamson, Professor of Economics of Law and Organization at Yale Uni-
versity, explains the basic premise of the Berle and Means work:
Plainly, many corporations have become very large: Sales and assets in some of these
firms run to tens of billions of dollars, and employment numbers in the hundreds of
thousands .... Since the large size of modern firms often resulted in diffuse owner-
ship, management purportedly assumed effective control. Berle and Means thus in-
quired whether, under these circumstances, there was "any justification for assuming
that those in control of a modern corporation will also choose to operate it in the inter-
ests of the owners." The possibility that management might operate the corporation in
its own interests could scarcely be dismissed.
Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J 1197, 1199 (1984) (quoting A. BERLE & G.
MEANS, supra note 9, at 121); see also Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and
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Berle and Means argued that this power made corporate managers
virtually unaccountable to stockholders." Berle and Means also
noted that management's goals often are diametrically opposed to
those of the stockholders."
Critics of the present corporate governance system often focus
on a second issue: the insensitivity of corporate managers to vari-
ous social and political concerns. 1" Ralph Nader and other con-
sumer advocates created a controversy in the 1970s over the unbri-
the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1985) (arguing that "[s]cattered
stockholders lack the requisite information and institutional mechanisms either to bargain
over the terms of management's employment, or to monitor and control management's
activities").
11. One commentator states:
Management would be fully accountable only if it could be replaced relatively easily by
stockholders, or a representative group thereof, whenever conflicts between manage-
ment and stockholders arose. However, management's power to maintain itself in office
through access to corporate funds for conducting proxy contests is notorious.
Christy, Corporate Mismanagement as Malpractice: A Critical Reanalysis of Corporate
Managers' Duties of Care and Loyalty, 21 Hous. L. REv. 105, 106 n.5 (1984). Professor
Christy further argues that corporate mismanagement causes virtually all business failures
and that the business judgment rule offers far too much protection. Id. at 107-09.
12. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 9, at 119-35. Many modern commentators
view the corporation as a mere legal vehicle for uniting the various factors of production in
an efficient manner. Because the corporation consists of many agents brought together to
create a product or service, conflicts of interest and agency costs are inherent in the organi-
zation. Shareholders want to minimize these agency costs, in turn maximizing their profit.
While enhancement of corporate profits also is likely to benefit management by increasing
job security and compensation, some managers will increase agency costs by making bad
judgments and engaging in self-aggrandizing behavior. For a discussion of potential manage-
rial abuses when corporate power becomes separated from its owners, see Christy, supra
note 11 (citing corporate expansion to gain prestige and higher salaries for management
without regard to increased profits for shareholders as examples of managerial abuse). For
recent economic literature discussing the separation of ownership and control, see generally
Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 301 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976); Manne, Mergers and the Mar-
ket for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Williamson, The Modern Corpora-
tion: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981). See also Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1170 n.26 (1981) (suggesting that there is nothing "undesirable in the
fact that many firms are controlled by managers rather than by stockholders" and that "this
'separation of ownership and control,' criticized so harshly in... The Modern Corporation
• . . is nothing but another way of describing the division of labor").
13. See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HAnv. L. REv. 1049 (1931);
Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932); Berle,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932). See
generally STAFF OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY (Comm.
Print 1980); Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964).
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dled growth of corporate power and the resulting social problems. 4
The controversy intensified dramatically because of certain egre-
gious occurrences, such as illegal campaign contributions and the
publicized bribery of foreign public officials.'" Corporate America's
perceived lack of concern for social issues became a topic of wide-
spread debate.
Reformists have advanced several proposals for increasing the
corporate hierarchy's responsiveness to the interests of both share-
holders and society. These include an increased number of outside
directors on corporate boards, 6 federal chartering of corpora-
tions,17 and federally imposed higher standards of managerial con-
duct.18 Because the majority of large corporations have voluntarily
increased the number of outside directors on their boards,19 and
14. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976) [here-
inafter GIANT CORPORATION]. Nader lists industrial pollution, toxic substances affecting
workers, discrimination, loss of job satisfaction at mid-levels due to non-innovative "organi-
zational" behavior, immense political power, invasions of privacy, local community domina-
tion, deceptive advertising, decreases in product safety, corporate concentration, irresponsi-
ble multinational corporate behavior (such as bleeding local resources and exploiting
workers), elite concentration of wealth, and instances of corporate crime as the major effects
of the unbridled growth of large corporations in America. Nader argues that lax standards in
some states virtually have eliminated the utility of state corporation law as a regulator.
Consequently, he advocates federal chartering of corporations in order to make corporate
America more responsive to the public at large.
15. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL PAYMENTS
AND PRACTICES SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM.,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 12, 1976).
16. For a discussion of the distinction between inside and outside directors, see supra
An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
17. See Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125
(1976). Professor Schwartz asserts that federal chartering
would be a comprehensive statute, applying federal standards consistently to all facets
of corporation law. . . . It would not be mired in the questionable policies of state law,
and it could scrap ineffectual practices. Moreover, the proper place to engage in far-
reaching changes which have uncertain economic consequences. . . is the Congress.
Id. at 1139. Schwartz feels that the ALl, despite its work with the Federal Securities Code,
is not the proper entity to draft this code. Federal chartering, according to Schwartz, re-
quires that either Congress or a special legislative task force enact such "policy and value-
judgment laden" legislation. See also GIANT CORPORATION, supra note 14, at 62-71.
18. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
LJ. 663 (1974). Professor Cary argues that the states have entered a "race to the bottom"
concerning their statutory standards of conduct for directors and officers. Cary credits Jus-
tice Brandeis for the "race to the bottom" phrase. According to Justice Brandeis, "Compa-
nies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in states where the cost was
lowest and laws least restrictive. The states joined in advertising their wares. The race was
not one of diligence but of laxity." Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); see also N. CHAMBERLAIN, SOCIAL STRATEGY AND CORPORATE STRUCTURE 125
(1982); Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545 (1984).
19. Smith, Corporate Governance: A Director's View, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 273, 279
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because federal chartering is politically impractical, 20 a call for na-
tional uniform standards of conduct is the most popular proposed
method of reform.2' The ALI Proposals seek, in part, to compile
the various proposals for reform into a single uniform act. As a
result, critics of the present corporate governance system are opti-
mistic about the American Law Institute's attempt to codify and
reform state corporation law.22
In contrast, other scholars argue that the present system of
corporate governance does not need extensive reform. These schol-
ars posit several arguments to support their assertion that the
market is the best regulator of managerial conduct." First, if a
firm operates profitably, its stock price will be higher than a less
profitable comparable firm.24 Because managers generally are com-
pensated correlatively with firm profits and because managers wish
to increase their own value to other potential employers, managers
naturally will seek to maximize firm profits and, hence, share-
holder wealth.25
Second, shareholders take little or no interest in the manage-
(1983) (citing a number of empirical studies demonstrating the increased independence of
corporate boards and stating that "the most notable aspect of the [corporate governance]
debate that has occurred during the past decade is . . . that most corporations have volun-
tarily implemented so many elements of this theory [of corporate reform]").
20. See Cary, supra note 18, at 700.
21. In fact, in 1980 Senator Metzenbaum and Congressman Rosenthal introduced into
the Senate and House, respectively, a federal statute proposing regulation of large corpora-
tions. See Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REC. S3574 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1980); Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980: Hearings
on S.2567 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1980).
22. Mofsky & Rubin, Introduction: A Symposium on the ALI Corporate Governance
Project, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169, 173 (1983) (stating that "those advocating reform in cor-
porate governance express more optimism for the achievement of changes in state law, espe-
cially changes bearing the prestigious imprimatur of the American Law Institute").
23. Professor Daniel Fischel of the Northwestern University School of Law is the most
prominent defender of the status quo. In his article The Corporate Governance Movement,
supra note 7, Professor Fischel contends that advocates of corporate reform have not de-
fined a true "piroblem" in corporate governance and that the arguments of those who advo-
cate the need for a change in corporate governance are based on a "failure to understand the
economic theory underlying the corporate form of firm organization" and are not supported
by any empirical evidence. Fischel, supra note 7, at 1259.
24. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
25. Fischel, supra note 7, at 1263. Professor Fischel further explains that because
managers work cooperatively, one manager's poor performance will affect adversely the
other managers' wealth and reputation. Managers, therefore, will monitor closely each
other's performance.
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ment of the firm26 and, therefore, are ineffective monitors of mana-
gerial behavior.17 If the firm's stock price drops or continually re-
mains low, shareholders are more likely simply to sell their shares
than to attack management's policies.28 Furthermore, if sharehold-
ers do undertake to monitor management, the challenges involved
in mounting a proxy battle might be overwhelming. Thus, prospec-
tive corporate raiders seek out corporations with unduly low stock
prices.2 9 If inefficient management permits a firm's stock price to
deteriorate, an outsider will have a greater incentive to launch a
takeover attempt, acquire the corporation, and replace existing
management with directors and officers who will adhere to higher
standards.3 0
Third, opponents of a uniform federal standard of conduct for
directors and officers assert that if lower standards of required con-
duct for directors and officers negatively affected shareholder
wealth, shareholders simply would boycott corporations chartered
in states with lax standards."' One empirical analysis suggests that
management usually will reincorporate in a state that maximizes
26. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1169 (noting that shareholders do not
realize the bulk of the gain from more efficient managerial behavior and, therefore, probably
will ignore most controversies within the firm).
27. Id. at 1173.
28. The idea that shareholders simply sell their stock rather than "voice" their dissat-
isfaction with managerial behavior has become known as the "Wall Street Rule." See An-
drews, Corporate Governance Eludes the Legal Mind, 37 U. MIAMi L. REv. 213, 216 (1983);
Weiss, supra note 7, at 5. But see Baysinger & Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the
Top: The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. Coin. L. 431 (1984) (arguing
that the exit option is not available for institutional or block shareholders, who would be
more likely to exercise control over corporate managers).
29. See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 28, at 449. Baysinger and Butler explain the
takeover process as follows:
If the managers of corporations do not act in their shareholders' best interests and
implement an effective governance structure, the price of the corporations' stock will
decline. There are two explanations for this phenomenon. First, higher costs (lower
productivity) will lower expectations about the future earnings stream and this will be
reflected in lower stock prices. Second, many shareholders who are dissatisfied with the
firm's performance will register their dissatisfaction by either selling their shares or
refusing to buy more. As a result of the increased relative supply, share prices will fall.
This fall increases the probability of a hostile takeover as it simultaneously reduces the
cost of purchasing control of the firm through a tender offer and increases the potential
profitability (capital gains) from improving the performance of the firm.
Id.
30. Fischel, supra note 7, at 1264.
31. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 920 (1982) (arguing that it is in
management's best interest to act in favor of shareholders and that Delaware's preeminence
in corporation law is explained best by the fact that its permissive statute actually maxi-
mizes shareholder welfare).
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stock price and shareholder wealth.2 Finally, while acknowledging
that some jurisdictions may provide either too little or too much
regulation for a particular corporation, advocates of the status quo
argue that maintaining the present system of variation among the
states provides a necessary diversity that services individual corpo-
rations with individual needs and unique stockholder
compositions."3
III. THE ALI PROPOSALS
This Special Project Note examines the specific proposals of
the ALI in order to determine their potential impact on the com-
mon law concerning corporations. The ALI Proposals consist of six
tentative drafts, each containing substantial revisions of the previ-
ous draft. No final draft exists at present; rather, each draft and its
subsequent commentary is intended to help mold the ALI Propos-
als into a realistic approach to governing modern corporations.
A. Objectives of the Corporation - Section 2.01
In an attempt to address the two major criticisms of modern
corporations-lack of managerial accountability 5 and social irre-
sponsibilityN6-the ALI enacted section 2.01 to govern the objec-
tives and conduct of a corporation. Many scholars and practition-
32. See Mofsky & Rubin, supra note 22, at 181. This article discusses an empirical
study conducted by Professors Dodd and Leftwich, see Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for
Corporate Charter: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. L. 259
(1980), which examined whether corporate managers chose Delaware as their incorporation
state with the intent to exploit shareholders. The study concluded that in a number of test
corporations stockholders actually received a 30% increase in returns following reincorpora-
tion in Delaware. According to these professors, management will reincorporate in the state
that best maximizes shareholder wealth.
33. See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 28, at 461 (stating that "[a] shift in jurisdic-
tion suggests a decision that the previous legal environment was not optimal for either
shareholders or managers"). According to Professor Mofsky and Mr. Rubin, a recent unpub-
lished study found that corporations with highly institutionalized shareholders migrate to
states with strict corporation laws granting shareholders greater power; corporations with
more diversified holdings opt for market regulation in the more liberal states. See Mofsky &
Rubin, supra note 22, at 181.
34. See Perkins, The ALI Corporate Governance Project in Midstream, 41 Bus. LAw.
1195 (1986) (explaining that commentators have found it difficult to critique the Principles
because they are "very much of a moving target," but noting that each successive draft
reflects the "commentary from consultants, advisors, members and interested individuals
and groups").
35. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
37. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1. Section 2.01 provides:
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities
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ers consider section 2.01 to be one of the least controversial
provisions in the ALI Principles."8 Nevertheless, subsequent sec-
tions concerning directors' and officers' duties - including the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty - all must be carried out in
accordance with the objectives of section 2.01.11 The statement of
objectives declares that a corporation should conduct its activities
"with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain. '40
Section 2.01 affords wide discretion, however, by allowing, but not
requiring, a reasonable amount of resources to be devoted to "pub-
lic welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic pur-
poses.""' The comment to section 2.01 suggests that profit max-
imization is not necessarily inconsistent with public-spirited
activity because, in the long run, an orientation toward lawful and
ethical behavior may enhance profits.4"
with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain, except that, whether or
not corporate profit and shareholder gain are thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the
conduct of its business
(a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries
set by law,
(b) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, and
(c) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian,
educational, and philanthropic purposes.
Id. § 2.01.
38. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Principles,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511 (1984).
39. Id. Comment c to § 2.01 states that § 2.01 "serves as a general guide to the con-
duct of the business corporation . . . [and] sets a backdrop for other, more specific provi-
sions in subsequent Parts, and assists in the interpretation of those provisions." T.D. No. 2,
suprh note 1, § 2.01 comment c.
40. Id. § 2.01 comment c.
41. Id. § 2.01(c); see also Perkins, supra note 34, at 1201. Thus, if the board of direc-
tors for the Chicago Cubs decides that it is more beneficial to the community, although less
profitable to shareholders, for the Cubs to play baseball during the daytime, then § 2.01,
along with the business judgment rule, would allow this discretion. See Shlensky v. Wrigley,
95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
42. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01 comment f. But see White, How Should We Talk
About Corporations? The Languages of Economics and Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416, 1424
(1985). Professor White argues that the ALI's supposed synthesis of economic objectives
and socially responsible behavior is imperfect because it furthers the view that socially re-
sponsible behavior is valuable only because it may increase long-term profits. White would
impose a loftier, but arguably less practical, standard: "The business corporation should
always endeavor to act as a responsible citizen in its economic and other activities." Id.
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B. Structure of the Corporation - Sections
3.01 and 3.02
Sections 3.0141 and 3.0244 of the ALI Proposals outline the
structure of a corporation and the various functions 45 of corporate
directors and officers. In formulating the structure for a modern
corporation, the ALI Reporters sought to incorporate two "impor-
tant social needs: '46 (1) flexibility in the corporate structure;47 and
43. Section 3.01 defines the powers and functions of a corporation's senior executives:
The management of the business of a publicly held corporation ... should be con-
ducted by or under the supervision of such senior executives. . . as may be designated
by the board of directors in accordance with the standards of the corporation . . . and
by those other officers . . . and employees to whom the management function is dele-
gated by those executives, subject to the powers and functions of the board under
§ 3.02.
T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.01.
44. Section 3.02 defines the powers and functions of the board of directors:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the board of directors of a publicly
held corporation should:
(1) Elect, evaluate, and, where appropriate, dismiss the principal senior
executives ...
(2) Oversee the conduct of the corporation's business with a view to evaluat-
ing, on an ongoing basis, whether the corporation's resources are being managed in
a manner consistent with the principles of § 2.01....
(3) Review and approve corporate plans and actions that the board or the
principal senior executives consider major, and changes in accounting principles
and practices that the board or the principal senior executives consider material.
(4) Perform such other functions as are prescribed by law, or assigned to the
board under a standard of the corporation ...
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute or by a standard of the corporation,
the board of directors of a publicly held corporation should also have power to:
(1) Make recommendations to shareholders.
(2) Initiate and adopt major corporate plans, commitments, and actions, and
material changes in accounting principles and practice; instruct any committee,
officer or other employee; and review the actions of any committee officer or other
employee.
(3) Manage the business of the corporation.
(4) Act as to all other corporate matters not requiring shareholder approval.
(c) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute or by a standard of the
corporation, and subject to the board's ultimate responsibility for oversight under
§ 3.02(a), the board may delegate to its committees authority to perform any of its
functions and exercise any of its powers.
Id. § 3.02.
45. See id., Introductory Note to Part III at 58. The Introductory Note states:
For purposes of clarity, the term "function" is used in Parts III-IV in a separate sense
from the term "duty." The term "function" is used to describe the tasks to be per-
formed by a particular corporate organ or official. The term "duty" is used to describe
the obligation of all corporate organs and officials to perform their functions in the
manner described in Parts IV and V.
Id.
46. Id. at 53. The Introductory Note explains that various provisions of Chapter III
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(2) protection of shareholders through greater management ac-
countability. 48 Section 3.01 states that the corporation's senior ex-
ecutives shall manage49 the daily business operations of a public
further the goals of flexibility and accountability:
(i) Some provisions, such as those concerning the functions of the senior executives
and the board, are formulated in terms of the rules that a well-instructed court would
be expected to adopt, giving weight to all the considerations that courts are expected to
take into account.
(ii) Some provisions, such as those concerning the nominating and compensation
committees and the makeup of the board, are formulated as recommendations concern-
ing corporate practice. These recommendations are made to corporations and their
counsel, and are not intended as legal rules, noncompliance with which would impose
liability. The purpose of these recommendations is to further the voluntary adoption of
structures that help enhance managerial accountability. . . .
(iii) Finally, one provision, concerning the presence and composition of an audit
committee in large publicly held corporations, is formulated as a recommended statu-
tory provision.
Id. at 55-56.
47. Tentative Draft No. 1 originally required, as a matter of black-letter law, that
outside directors compose a majority of the board; that these outside directors have more
power than the inside directors; and that every corporation have an audit committee, a
nominating committee, and a compensation committee composed entirely of outside direc-
tors. T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, §§ 3.03-3.07. Largely because of the angry reaction to Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, Tentative Draft No. 2 omitted the requirement of a majority of outside
directors, eliminated the distinction in power between inside and outside directors, and re-
tained only the audit committee provision. See T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, Foreword at ix.
These changes expand a corporation's flexibility by greatly "contract[ing] the scope of rec-
ommended legal mandates in favor of much broader opportunity for voluntary variations."
Id. For a discussion of the dangers of a highly structured corporation model, see Andrews,
Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 34, reprinted
in Roundtable Statement, supra note 7. See also Smith, Corporate Governance: A Direc-
tor's View, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 273 (1983).
48. The Introductory Note to Chapter III acknowledges that both the product and
capital markets, as well as direct review by shareholders, act as checks on managerial behav-
ior. See supra notes 9-33 and accompanying text. The comment, however, warns that
[d]irect review by the body of shareholders . . . is seldom efficacious in publicly held
corporations, because of the disparate and shifting nature of the shareholder body and
the complexity of modern management issues . . . . Similarly, the discipline of the
market for corporate control is limited by a number of elements, including the high
transaction costs of takeover bids, the necessity to offer a premium well in excess of
market price, the requirements of relevant statutes, the defensive techniques available,
the incentives to take over well-run rather than poorly run companies and the time-lag
often experienced by the public in ascertaining lack of managerial efficiency.
T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, Introductory Note at 54. Thus, the ALI Reporters view the board
of directors as a particularly important guarantor of managerial accountability.
49. See Am. B. Ass'n, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law Committee
on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1978).
It is generally recognized that the board of directors is not expected to operate the
business. Even under statutes providing that the business and affairs shall be "man-
aged" by the board of directors, it is recognized that actual operation is a function of
management. The responsibility of the board is limited to overseeing such operation.
Id. at 1603.
-- A--
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corporation.5" Section 3.02 states that the board of directors is re-
quired to "oversee" the activities of the corporation."
Section 3.02 requires the board to perform certain minimum
functions, but permits it to be as active as necessary.52 The com-
ment to section 3.02 acknowledges that this formulation differs
from most state statutes. Nevertheless, the ALI Reporters assert
that their articulation provides a summary of "basic functions and
powers which almost certainly would be arrived at by the courts in
light of the language of these statutes, read in the context of mod-
ern corporate practice.
'5 3
The idea that corporate directors merely should "oversee" the
corporation, not "manage" it, stems from the realization that cor-
porate directors simply do not have the time to participate actively
in the daily affairs of the corporation. 4 In response to this reality,
50. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.01. The Reporter's Note following § 3.01 provides
that senior executives, especially the president, may take actions in the ordinary course of
business. Extraordinary actions are reserved for the board of directors.
Examples of the kinds of actions that would normally be "extraordinary" include the
creation of long-term or other significant debt, the reacquisition of equity or debt se-
curities, significant capital investments, business combinations including those effected
for cash, the disposition of significant businesses, entry into important new lines of
business, significant acquisitions of stock in other corporations, and actions that would
forseeably expose the corporation to significant litigation or significant new regulatory
problems. A useful generalization is that decisions which would make a significant
change in the structure of the business enterprise, or the structure of control over the
enterprise, are extraordinary corporate actions and therefore normally outside the ap-
parent authority of senior executives.
Id., Reporter's Note at 65.
The Reporter's Note further explains that the proper delineation of functions between
the board and the senior executives is a matter of business judgment for the board of direc-
tors. Id. at 63-65.
51. Id. § 3.02; see supra note 44.
52. See T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.02 comment c at 68-69 (noting that because
§ 3.02 sets forth few minimum functions for the board, it "permits virtually unlimited vari-
ation in the structuring of the relationship between the board and the senior executives").
53. Id. § 3.02 comment a at 67. The Reporter asserts that the board could fulfill most
existing statutes' requirements simply by performing the "oversight" function. The Re-
porter quotes Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981), for the pro-
position that "fd]irectorial management does not require a detailed inspection of day-to-day
activities, but rather a general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies." Id. at 32, 432
A.2d at 822. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 38-46 and accom-
panying text; Revised Model Act (Special Project) notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
54. See Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1481 (1984). Bayless Manning, an attorney with Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New York, NY, notes several reasons why a director
cannot "manage" the corporation's affairs:
(1) a "real-world" director devotes relatively little time to the corporation;
(2) the size and complexity of a large corporation's problems are virtually unman-
ageable for a "part-time" director;
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Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg55 developed the monitoring model
concept,56 which indirectly evaluates the overall performance of
the senior executives rather than directly supervising their activi-
ties.57 While Herbert Wechsler, former director of the American
Law Institute, asserts that changes were made between the first
and second tentative drafts "to assure that the 'monitoring' model
for the function of directors of a large, publicly held corporation is
not thought to be prescribed,""8 at least one commentator asserts
(3) at directors meetings ordinary board decisions often crowd out truly pressing
issues because they are "compulsory agenda items;"
(4) directors are required to make risky decisions without complete information;
(5) the composition of the modern board is increasingly diverse and often includes
directors not well-versed in business matters;
(6) the board of directors usually takes action by a consensus vote; and
(7) a typical board will only address approximately ten to fifteen major transac-
tions a year.
Id. at 1481-83.
55. Professor Eisenberg is a Reporter for Parts I, II, and III of the ALI Principles.
56. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 156-69 (1976). Professor
Eisenberg asserts that because the board of directors cannot "manage" the corporation
effectively,
four clusters of functions remain: providing advice and counsel to the office of the chief
executive; authorizing major corporate actions; providing a modality by which persons
other than executives can be formally represented in corporate decisionmaking; and
selecting and dismissing the members of the chief executive's office and monitoring
that office's performance.
Id. at 157 (footnote omitted).
Professor Eisenberg, however, concludes: (1) that the advice and counsel function is not
essential ("[i]f the chief executive does want outside advice, he can and frequently will ob-
tain it from the corporation's lawyers, accountants, or bankers, rather than from the board,"
id. at 157-58); (2) that while the authorization function is important, its utility is limited
("beyond serving as an audience, and a generally agreeable one at that, the board's review-
ing role is usually quite limited, since its decisions must normally turn on analysis prepared
by the very executives who formulate that which is being analyzed," id. at 159); and (3) that
other "modalities" equally can represent shareholder groups ("[tlhese [other] modalities
may be more effective mechanisms than board membership for the exercise of influence by
client and social groups, since they can be closely tailored to the substantive and procedural
needs of each group," id. at 161). Thus, Eisenberg sees the monitoring function as critical.
He argues that the selection of senior officers is more than a mere formality, despite the out-
going chief executive officer's influence. While board emphasis presently is placed on poli-
cymaking, the monitoring model allows the board to hold officers accountable "for adequate
results (whether financial, social or both), while the role of the executives is to determine
how to achieve those results." Id. at 165 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, Eisenberg notes
that the board's independence from management is inherent in the notion that directors
must monitor the performance of senior management. He cites two necessary elements in a
properly functioning monitoring model: (1) an independent board; and (2) a free flow of, or
at least an ability to obtain, impartial and substantial information on the executives' per-
formance. Thus, Professor Eisenberg sees the monitoring model as a means of utilizing the
board's time effectively in a capacity that assures managements accountability. Id. at 170.
57. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.02 comment d at 69.
58. Id. Foreword at ix.
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that the ALI formulation is consistent with Professor Eisenberg's
monitoring model.59
Section 3.02(a)(1) of Tentative Draft No. 2 of the ALI Princi-
ples provides that the board of directors shall select and evaluate
senior executives.6 0 Furthermore, section 3.02(a)(2) provides that
the board shall "[o]versee the conduct of the corporation's busi-
ness with a view to evaluating, on an ongoing basis, whether the
corporation's resources are being managed in a manner consistent
with the principles of section 2.01. '61 While the comment to Sec-
tion III recognizes that the board should not have an adversarial
relationship with senior management, 2 it also emphasizes the im-
portance of the board's monitoring role in fulfilling corporate
objectives."' Finally, section 3.02 requires the board to review and
approve all corporate plans that either the board or senior manage-
ment considers material. 4
The monitoring model concept spurred a movement to require
that corporate boards contain "outside"65 or independent directors
59. See Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 535, 549-50 (1984).
60. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.02(a)(1).
61. Id. § 3.02(a)(2).
62. Comment d to § 3.02 states:
The board's obligation to oversee the performance of the principal senior executives
does not imply an antagonistic relationship between the board and the executives.
Rather, it contemplates a collegial relationship that is supportive as well as watchful.
To paraphrase the Business Roundtable Statement, the relationship between the
board and the executives should be challenging yet positive, arm's length but not
adversary.
Id. § 3.02 comment d at 69 (citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 3.02(a)(3). Comment f to Part III lists examples of "major corporate actions:"
the creation of significant long-term debt, programs for the reacquisition of equity or
debt securities, significant capital investments, significant acquisitions of stock in other
corporations, business combinations including those effected for cash, and the disposi-
tion of significant businesses.
65. In § 1.26 the ALI Principles define an "outside" director as one not having a "sig-
nificant relationship" to the corporation. Section 1.26 provides in part:
(1) Except as provided in § 1.26(2), a director has a "significant relationship" with
the senior executives. . . of a corporation if, as of the record date for the annual meet-
ing of shareholders:
(a) He is employed by the corporation, or was so employed within the two
preceding years;
(b) He is a member of the immediate family of an individual who (a) is em-
ployed by the corporation as an officer, or (b) was employed by the corporation as
a senior executive within the two preceding years;
(c) He has made to or received from the corporation, during either of its two
preceding fiscal years, commercial payments . . . which exceeded 200,000, or he
owns or has power to vote an equity interest. . .in a business organization. . . to
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as well as inside management.6 6 Professor Eisenberg and others 7
have argued that nonmanagement directors would provide a better
check on senior executives.6 8 In fact, Tentative Draft No. 1 of the
ALI Principles required a board of directors to consist of a major-
ity of outside directors.69 This proposal was deleted, however,
in Tentative Draft No. 2.70 Instead, section 3.03 requires that
which the corporation made, or from which the corporation received, during either
of its two preceding fiscal years, commercial payments that, when multiplied by
his percentage equity interest in the organization, exceeded $200,000;
(d) He is a principal manager of a business organization to which the corpora-
tion made, or from which the corporation received, during either of the organiza-
tion's two preceding fiscal years, commercial payments that exceeded 5 percent of
the organization's consolidated gross revenues for that year, or $200,000, which-
ever is more; or
(e) He is affiliated in a professional capacity with a law firm that was the
primary legal adviser to the corporation with respect to general corporate or secur-
ities-law matters, or with an investment-banking firm that was retained by the
corporation in an advisory capacity or acted as a managing underwriter in an issue
of the corporation's securities, within the two preceding years, or was so affiliated
with such a law or investment-banking firm when it was so retained or so acted.
(2) A director shall not be deemed to have a significant relationship with the senior
executives under § 1.26(1)(c)-(e) if, on the basis of countervailing or other special cir-
cumstances, it could not reasonably be believed that the judgment of a person in the
director's position would be affected by his relationship under § 1.26(1)(c)-(e).
(3) For purposes of § 1.26 (and § 1.19, to the extent it is incorporated in § 1.26 by
reference) the term "the corporation" includes any corporation that controls . . . the
corporation, and any subsidiary or other business organization that is controlled by the
corporation, and the term "year," used without the qualifying term "fiscal," means the
twelve preceding months.
Id. § 1.26 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
66. Karmel, supra note 59, at 543.
67. Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the SEC from 1977 to 1981, also was influential
in seeking to establish boards consisting entirely of outside directors. He stated that "direc-
tors who have business links to the corporation impose a cost on the accountability process,
and we need to consider carefully in each situation whether that cost is a necessary one to
incur, and whether the benefits can be achieved in other ways." Williams, Corporate Ac-
countability and Corporate Power, in THE 1979 BENJAMIN F. FAIRLESS MEMORIAL LECTURES:
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPORATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
18 (1979).
68. But see Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Direc-
tors, 96 HARD. L. REV. 1894, 1901 (1983) (arguing that the board of directors' "cohesiveness"
and informational dependence on management will lead it to conform to management's
views); Scott, supra note 7, at 934 (noting that "inside directors have much stronger reasons
to monitor effectively and to strive for accurate judgments because their careers are at
stake").
69. T.D. No. 1, supra note 1, § 3.03.
70. Perkins, supra note 34, at 1202 (stating that the proposal was deleted because
most large, publicly held corporations already had a majority of outside directors). Section
3.04 recommends that, as "a matter of corporate practice," a majority of the board of a
large, publicly held corporation have no significant relationship with the senior executives:
It is recommended as a matter of corporate practice that:
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large,'7 1 publicly held corporations have an audit committee, com-
posed of at least three outside directors, to oversee the corpora-
tion's audit process. 72 The ALI Reporters assert that this require-
ment provides sufficient objectivity to review management
performance and to encourage the exposure of "potentially troub-
lesome issues at a relatively early stage."73
(a) The board of every large publicly held corporation. should have a majority
of directors who are free of any significant relationship. . . with the corporation's sen-
ior executives ...unless a majority of the corporation's voting securities ... are
owned by a single person . . . a family group . . . or a control group...
(b) the board of a publicly held corporation. . . that does not fall within subsec-
tion (a) should have at least three directors who are free of any significant relationship
with the corporation's senior executives.
T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.04.
These nonmandatory provisions are intended to encourage corporate directors and of-
ficers to take voluntary steps toward making management more accountable to sharehold-
ers. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
71. The ALI Proposals provide that a corporation will fall into one of three categories:
(1) a large, publicly held corporation, defined as a corporation having 2000 or more record-
holders of its equity securities and $100 million or more in assets; (2) a publicly held corpo-
ration, defined as a corporation having 500 or more recordholders of its equity securities and
$3 million in assets; or (3) anything smaller. See T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, Part III Introduc-
tory Note at 57-58. A corporation does not fall out of a particular category, however, unless
it remains below that standard for two consecutive years. Id.; see also supra An Historical
Perspective (Special Project) note 31 and accompanying text.
72. Section 3.03 provides:
Every large publicly held corporation. . . should have an audit committee, to oversee
the audit process, consisting of at least three members, and composed of directors who
are neither employed by the corporation nor persons who were so employed within the
two preceding years, including at least a majority of members who have no significant
relationship . . . with the corporation's senior executives.
T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.03. The Reporter proposes that this audit committee be
mandatory for first-tier or large, publicly held corporations. The Reporter acknowledges
that an audit committee is not required by any state except Connecticut. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 33-318(b) (Supp. 1986). Comment a, however, states that while this provision would
be a new proposal, corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) already
are required to have an audit committee. Because most first-tier corporations are listed on
the NYSE, the Reporter believes that this provision is simply a needed codification of a
widespread, current corporate practice.
Comment b to § 4.01(a) (the duty of care provision, see infra notes 86-109), in referring
to a director's functions, states that "it is a matter of legislative intent in each instance as to
whether or not the principles expressed in § 4.01(a) are applicable to breaches of specially
imposed functions and obligations." Thus, the Reporter leaves open the question as to
whether directors with special or unique obligations, such as directors serving on a board
committee analyzing a proposed takeover, are exposed to greater liabilty. See generally T.D.
No. 2, supra note 1, Reporter's Note at 80-82. But see Andrews, supra note 47, at 38 (argu-
ing that these changes are too formal and inflexible-possibly imposing liability on directors
for failure to institute the proper structure).
73. T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.03 comment c(ii).
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The changes 4 in Tentative Draft No. 2 have decreased the ALI
Principles' impact on the overall structure of corporations and the
specified responsibilities of directors and officers.75 Nevertheless,
the ALI formulation is far more explicit than the Revised Model
Act's provisions," and many commentators suggest that the inflex-
ible approach proposed by the ALI ultimately will inhibit the ef-
fectiveness of the board of directors.77 While the ALI Proposals
clearly depart from the present law, they are, to a certain extent,
reflective of current corporate practice. Until a concensus develops
over whether it is necessary or proper to restructure the majority
of corporate boards in the United States, the ALI Proposals will
continue to be controversial.
IV. THE DUTY OF CARE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE -
SECTION 4.01
Until the recent Smith v. Van Gorkom s decision, few courts
had found corporate directors or officers liable for breaching their
duty of care absent self-dealing or truly egregious behavior.7 9
Courts often have confused the terms "agent," "trustee," and "fi-
duciary" in defining the legal relationship of directors and officers
to the corporation."s Furthermore, the common law has developed
not one but three divergent standards governing directors' and of-
74. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
75. See Karmel, supra note 59, at 554.
76. The Revised Model Act has been revised to state that a corporation "shall be man-
aged under the direction of" a board of directors. See supra Revised Model Act (Special
Project) notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 47, at 286-89. Bryan Smith is a member of a number
of major corporate boards, including those of Texas Instruments, Mary Kay Cosmetics, and
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Smith argues that such a rigid formulation of who constitutes an
outside director will deprive boards of valuable corporation-specific experience. Further-
more, when one considers who may be an outside director within this definition, the formu-
lation leaves a dearth of persons who might have knowledge about the corporation's busi-
ness. Finally, Smith argues that different corporations will have different needs regarding
board composition and functions. He finds the monitoring function too restrictive because it
"may foreclose the use of more effective board structures and discourage experimentation
with board activity in areas that are not purely monitoring." Id. at 289.
78. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See supra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes
48-86 and accompanying text.
79. The 19-year-old proposition that "[t]he search for cases in which directors of in-
dustrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated
by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack"
remains true. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968).
80. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 2-5 and accompanying
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ficers' duty of care."1
In response to this judicial confusion, the American Law Insti-
tute has codified directors' and officers' duty of care and the busi-
ness judgment rule.8 2 Neither the Revised Model Business Corpo-
81. Roswell Perkins, current President of the American Law Institute, notes that some
courts have intermixed various standards within one case:
Courts have frequently mixed up their standards in the same opinion in the most con-
fusing manner, sometimes as if the standards were virtually interchangeable. For exam-
ple, a court may articulate some impossibly rigid fiduciary standard, drawn from an-
cient trust law, and then, after analysis of the facts, absolve a director or officer from
liability for a corporate act because he did not show bad faith, venality, intent to harm
or failure to meet some other loose standard far removed from the trust-type language
from whence the court commenced its analysis.
Perkins, supra note 34, at 1203; see also supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project)
notes 11-14 and accompanying text. The three most common standards for the duty of care
are (1) that degree of care required to avoid gross negligence, (2) that degree of care that an
ordinarily prudent director or a person in a like position would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances, and (3) that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in
conducting personal affairs.
82. Section 4.01 of Tentative Draft No. 4 states:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his functions in
good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be
expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.
(1) This duty includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made, such in-
quiry as the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances.
(2) In performing any of his functions (including his oversight functions), a
director or officer is entitled to rely on materials and persons in accordance with
§§ 4.02-.03.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute or by a standard of the corporation
.. . and subject to the board's ultimate responsibility for oversight, in performing its
functions (including oversight functions), the board may delegate, formally or infor-
mally by course of conduct, any function (including the function of identifying matters
requiring the attention of the board) to committees of the board or to directors, of-
ficers, employees, experts, or other persons; a director may rely on such committees
and persons in fulfilling his duty under this Section with respect to any delegated func-
tion if his reliance is in accordance with §§ 4.02-.03.
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his
duty under this Section if:
(1) he is not interested . . . in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the
extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of
the corporation.
(d) A person challenging the conduct of a director or officer under this Section has
the burden of proving a breach of duty of care (and the inapplicability of the provi-
sions as to the fulfillment of duty under Subsection (b) or (c)), and the burden of
proving that the breach was the legal cause of damage suffered by the corporation.
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01 (footnotes omitted).
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ration Act8 3 nor any state statute84 presently codifies the business
judgment rule; the ALI articulation represents the first attempt at
codification by a major legal organization.
A. The Duty of Care - Section 4.01(a)
Section 4.01(a) of the ALI Principles outlines corporate direc-
tors' and officers' duty of care. The ALI Reporters adopted the ma-
jority standard for the duty of care: the care that an ordinarily
prudent person reasonably would be expected to exercise in a like
position under similar circumstances.8 5 This language echoes tradi-
tional common-law negligence standards. The debate continues,
however, over whether the prevailing test should be one of ordi-
nary negligence or gross negligence.8 6
Applying an ordinary negligence standard is problematic be-
cause the policy considerations in an ordinary tort case - deter-
rence and shifting losses - are very different from those underly-
ing a derivative suit.8 7 Furthermore, if courts were to apply an
83. The drafters of the Revised Model Act published a codification of the business
judgment rule in the 1980 Exposure Draft. This provision received much criticism, however,
and was withdrawn in the final version of the Revised Model Act. See supra Revised Model
Act (Special Project) note 62 and accompanying text.
84. The comment to § 4.01(c) states that "[t]here are no statutory formulations of the
business judgment rule" and that "[j]udicial formulations of the rule have varied." See T.D.
No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) comment a at 58-59. The ALI Reporter believes that precise
codification is necessary for exactly this reason. Id. But see Roundtable Statement, supra
note 7, at 48 (arguing that the Tentative Draft No. 1 formulation "does not in fact restate
current law").
85. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01. For the full text of § 4.01, see supra note 82. This
standard also has been adopted by a majority of the states, see supra An Historical Per-
spective (Special Project) notes 15-20 and accompanying text, as well as by the Revised
Model Act, see supra Revised Model Act (Special Project) note 36 and accompanying text.
86. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 50-59 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the judicial dichotomy between ordinary and gross negligence); Veasey
& Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule and the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case,
and the ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TPx. L. REv. 1483, 1493 (1985) (citing Francis
v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 34, 432 A.2d 814, 823 (1981), and Hunt v. Aufderheide,
330 Pa. 362, 366, 199 A. 345, 347 (1983), for the proposition that some courts require the
exercise of ordinary care, but also noting that other authorities insist that "the prevailing
test is gross negligence"). For a somewhat unorthodox view that an ordinary negligence
standard is commendable despite the cost to corporate fiduciaries, see Steinberg, The Amer-
ican Law Institute's Draft Restatement on Corporate Governance: The Business Judgment
Rule, Related Principles, and Some General Observations, 37 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 295, 304-05
(1983).
87. Kennedy, The Standard of Responsibility for Directors, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
624, 630 (1984).
In the corporate context [as opposed to the tort context], it is simply unrealistic to
expect loss shifting from shareowners to directors, where directors have not been dis-
honest or have not gained a personal advantage to the detriment of share owners.
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ordinary negligence standard to a director's actions, almost any
business failure could constitute a breach of the duty of care."8 In
essence, an ordinary negligence test operates on an instance-by-in-
stance basis, potentially imposing liability on a director for any in-
correct decision. 9 Innovation in American business requires that
courts not hold directors to a rigorous standard, but rather permit
them to make decisions using their best business judgment without
fear of liability.90 The purpose of the business judgment rule,
therefore, is to protect directors' decisions if they act in good faith
and have a rational business purpose9' in making the decision.
92
Losses caused by honest mistakes on the part of the board can amount to many times
the resources of even affluent directors.
Id. at 643.
88. Manning, supra note 54, at 1486. Mr. Manning asserts that because of the complex
nature of corporate decisions, no director ever will acquire all possible information when
investigating a decision. In retrospect, therefore, a plaintiff can present a persuasive case
that the director could and should have taken into consideration a particular publication or
study that would have prevented the faulty decision.
89. The imposition of liability on an instance-by-instance basis is inappropriate and
unrealistic because it is impossible to make an exhaustive, all-encompassing investigation
for each decision. See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 630. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has stated:
While it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable for negligence
in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is mislead-
ing .... Whereas an automobile driver who makes a mistake in judgment as to speed
or distance injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in damages, a
corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment as to economic conditions, con-
sumer tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found liable for dam-
ages suffered by the corporation .... Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liabil-
ity is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and
this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctri-
nally labelled the business judgment rule.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
90. Hansen, supra note 7, at 1241; see also Demsetz, The Monitoring of Management
in Roundtable Statement, supra note 7, at Exhibit B. Professor Demsetz, a professor of
economics, discusses the problem of the decrease in innovative risk-taking that results when
a director's exposure to liability is increased:
Board members prepared to tolerate frequent poor performance in order to increase
the probability of an occasional big profit payoff to the firm are put at greater risk of
being sued successfully than are members who seek to guide their firms into policies
that are very typical of those being adopted by other firms .... This bias in the
board's decisions would work to the disadvantage of stockholders over the long run
because the risk of being second guessed about business decisions in a court of law
inevitably creates a tendency to avoid strategies that seek an occasional big profit pay-
off from a policy different than that being followed by "the crowd." Such a policy will
be avoided to some extent even when it is expected to yield large enough profits in a
few years to more than offset the more frequent losses that are a necessary prelude to
such a payoff.
Demsetz, supra, at B-1.
91. The "rational business purpose" element of the business judgment rule is contro-
Iversial. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
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Thus, despite the "ordinarily prudent director" standard articu-
lated in many statutes" and opinions, 94 most courts have held di-
rectors personally liable only if they were grossly negligent.9 5
Critics of the ALI Proposals argue that section 4.01 does not
accurately reflect present corporation law.96 Charles Hansen, gen-
eral counsel for Emerson Electric, asserts that while courts have
often espoused the "ordinarily prudent person in similar circum-
stances" language in dicta, their holdings reflect that a director will
not be held liable absent egregious behavior.9 7 Mr. Hansen, there-
fore, argues that the ALI standard for the duty of care should re-
flect the courts' actual holdings, not their dicta. 8 In contrast, Ros-
92. The business judgment rule has been codified by the ALI in § 4.01(c) of Tentative
Draft No. 4. See infra notes 110-32 and accompanying text. For a discussion of various
common-law formulations of the business judgment rule, see supra An Historical Perspec-
tive (Special Project) notes 52-57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the various
elements of the business judgment rule as articulated in recent court decisions, see Veasey &
Seitz, supra note 86, at 1484-93.
93. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 15 and accompanying
text.
94. See id. note 20 and accompanying text.
95. See id. note 53 and accompanying text.
96. Hansen, supra note 7, at 1237.
97. According to Mr. Hansen:
Two primary problems exist [with the ALI formulation]. The first is that a torts-de-
rived results-oriented standard has been used for formulating the duty of due care. The
second is the Reporters' failure to distinguish sharply between case holdings and dicta.
These problems together make the duty of care and business judgment provisions, as
drafted, difficult to understand and apply consistently with current law.
Id. at 1237-38 (footnote omitted); see also Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance, A
Critique of Part IV, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 653, 662 (1984) (stating that "[t]he Reporter's
choice of dictum over holding represents a preference for formalistic statement of doctrine
over contextual focus").
98. But see Steinberg, supra note 86, at 304. Professor Steinberg interprets § 7.06(d)
of Tentative Draft No. 1, which proposes a ceiling on damages for negligence, to indicate
that the Reporter endorses a "negligence" standard. He asserts that "[tihe Draft Restate-
ment seeks to overcome this judicial reluctance [to find directors liable] by making it explic-
itly clear that negligent behavior by corporate fiduciaries is actionable." Id. According to
William Kennedy, the ceiling's purpose is "to enhance directors' due-care obligations by
increasing the likelihood of judgments adverse to defendants. The whole thrust of the ceil-
ing is to invite courts to 'sting' but not 'bust' directors." Kennedy, supra note 87, at 642
(footnote omitted). Mr. Kennedy notes that the most likely effect of the ceiling will be to
encourage settlements between shareholder-plaintiffs and director-defendants because po-
tential liability for an honest mistake will be increased, while the likelihood of receiving an
unlimited judgment against a director remains fairly low. Faced with this situation, direc-
tors would be more likely to settle and avoid a costly legal defense. Id.
The new ceiling provision, § 7.17(a) of Tentative Draft No. 6, states:
(a) If a failure by a director. . or an officer ... to meet the standard of conduct
specified in § 4.01 did not
(1) involve a knowing and culpable violation of law; or
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well Perkins, president of the American Law Institute, argues that
because the word "negligence" does not appear in the ALI's articu-
lation, courts will continue to analyze specific fact situations
"under a time-honored and generalized articulation of the
concept."99
Some commentators assert that the ALI standard will make
directors more cautious and less willing to take risks, thereby in-
hibiting business innovation.1 °0 Furthermore, these commentators
argue, the phrase "in a like position, and under similar circum-
stances" assumes that judges interpreting this standard will have
an informed perception of corporate directors' responsibilities and
pressures.101 In reality, however, there is no universal list of direc-
(2) enable the defendant, or an associate. . . to receive an improper benefit to
which the defendant, or such associate, was not entitled under Part V; or
(3) show a conscious disregard for the defendant's duty to the corporation
under circumstances that threatened serious injury to the corporation; or
(4) constitute a sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that
amounted to an abdication of the defendant's duty to the corporation, damages
for the violation should be limited to an amount that is not disproportionate to
the economic benefits to the defendant for serving the corporation.
T.D. No. 6, supra note 1, § 7.17(a).
Comment c to this provision provides that "[a]lthough the business judgment rule
should serve as the primary bulwark of protection for the board, even the diligent and pru-
dent director who complies fully with the requisite standard of care may fear that the
factfinder will misperceive the actual facts." T.D. No. 6, supra note 1, § 7.17(a) comment c.
Thus, § 7.17 does not covert § 4.01(a) into a negligence standard as Professor Steinberg
proposes. Section 7.17 applies after the determination of a breach of the duty of care. Com-
ment a to § 4.01(a) states that "the black letter set forth in the first paragraph of Subsection
(a) is consistent with the duty of care standards articulated in most jurisdictions today."
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, at 8. The current standard is one of gross negligence and was not
intended to be changed by the § 7.17 ceiling on damages.
99. Perkins, supra note 34, at 1205.
100. See, e.g., Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 34, 38, reprinted in Roundtable Statement, supra note 7, at Exhibit A;
see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
101. Cf. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a) comment h. Comment h states that:
Courts should, of course, apply § 4.01(a)'s reasonable care standards with balance, fair-
ness, and a realistic sense of what may reasonably be expected, in given circumstances,
from a corporation's directors and officers. . . .Any judgment as to whether a given
director has exercised the requisite care with respect to the board's oversight obliga-
tions should take into account all relevant circumstances. These may include:
(i) the forseeability of the problem that allegedly developed because of the claimed
failure of oversight;
(ii) the forseeability of the magnitude of the problem that developed;
(iii) the state of the corporation's business during the period in question (e.g., was
it a period of stable profitability or of financial crisis and corporate change);
(iv) the complexity and scale of the corporation;
(v) the reliability of, and confidence to be placed in, other directors, officers, em-
ployees, experts, other persons, and committees of the board . . . and
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tors' functions nor an authoritative source delineating directors'
common experiences."0 2
B. The Duty of Inquiry - Section 4.01(a)(1)(a)
Encompassed within section 4.01's duty of care standard is the
requirement that a director make "such inquiry as the director or
officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circum-
stances. 103 At present only one state statute contains a similar
"reasonable inquiry" provision; 104 the ALI Reporters, however, as-
sert that a director's or officer's duty to inquire is "generally recog-
nized in the case law and by commentators. "105
(vi) the precise role the director played within the corporation during the period in
question. For example, the length of time that a director has served on the board and
whether a director assumed special obligations (e.g., as a member of the audit commit-
tee) or was attentive and diligent in general with respect to corporate affairs during the
period may be relevant in evaluating whether he had exercised reasonable care.
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a) comment h.
102. Manning, supra note 54, at 1493. Mr. Manning points out that it is difficult for
nondirectors to comprehend a director's experience and also that individual boards of direc-
tors vary widely in their mode of operation, thus making each experience unique. Id. at
1482-83. The ALI responds to this problem in § 4.01(a) comment e:
There is an increasing body of literature. . . which will undoubtedly continue to ex-
pand, [which] should help to illuminate for courts the meaning of "in a like position
and under similar circumstances." The comments made in the Introductory Note to
Part IV are pertinent here. These pertain to the practical limitation on what can be
expected of a director or officer by virtue of such factors as the complexity of the mod-
ern corporation, the need for reliance, and the group dynamics of the board room.
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a) comment e; see also supra note 101 and accompanying
text.
103. T. D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(1).
104. California Corporation Code § 3.09(a) provides:
(a) A director shall perform the duties of a director, including duties as a member
of any committee of the board upon which the director may serve, in good faith, in a
manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and with
such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would use under similar circumstances.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 3.09 (West 1977) (emphasis added).
The legislative committee comment, however, explains that a director is not required to
inquire "regardless of the circumstances," but only if the director is put on notice by the
presence of "suspicious circumstances." Id. commentary at 188; see Stern, The General
Standard of Care Imposed On Directors Under the New California General Corporation
Law, 23 U.C.LA L. REv. 1269, 1279 (1976) (cited by the ALI Reporters in comment a to
§ 4.01(a)(1)-(2)).
105. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01 (a)(1)-(2) comment a at 43. In support of this
proposition, the Reporters cite Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)(stat-
ing that "[d]irectors have an individual duty to keep themselves informed in some detail"),
and Frances v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981), which states:
Directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities of the
corporation .... Directors may not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and then
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In contrast, existing corporation law requires a director or of-
ficer to inquire only if circumstances would place a reasonable di-
rector or officer on notice.' Thus, the Business Roundtable, when
commenting on Tentative Draft No. 1, argued that the ALI Princi-
ples' provision went "beyond current law. ' 10 7 Perhaps because of
the Roundtable's criticism, section 4.01(a)(1) of Tentative Draft
No. 4 was changed to read as follows:
This duty includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made, an inquiry
claim that because they did not see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look.
The sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged to
protect. . . .Directorial management does not require a detailed inspection of day-to-
day activities, but rather a general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies.
Frances, 87 N.J. at 31-32, 432 A.2d at 822. The Reporters assert that the "inquiry" obliga-
tion is an inherent element of the duty of care; therefore, § 4.01(a)(1) merely provides clar-
ity and "does not expand the obligation that already exists under current law." T.D. No. 4,
supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(1) comment a at 44-45.
106. A director must investigate when suspicious circumstances trigger an inquiry.
This "red flag" test was first articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963). The Graham court found that the
directors had no duty to "ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect ex-
ists." Id. at 85, 188 A.2d at 130.
107. Roundtable Statement, supra note 7, at 46. The Business Roundtable points out
that California is the only state to adopt a "reasonable inquiry" provision. Nevertheless,
even the legislative comment to the California statute, see supra note 104, adopts a "notice-
inquiry" standard that is "perfectly consistent" with current case law. Roundtable State-
ment, supra note 7, at 47.
Citing the commentary to § 4.01(b) of Tentative Draft No. 1, which requires reasonable
inquiry from directors "in most instances" concerning major corporate changes and commit-
ments, the Roundtable argues that § 4.01(b) of Tentative Draft No. 1 could be interpreted
as eliminating the "notice" requirement and endorsing a general duty of inquiry within the
duty of care. Id. The Roundtable also reviewed Advisory Group Draft No. 3, which con-
tained language resembling the Tentative Draft No. 4 § 4.01(a)(1) formulation, and stated
that it was a "step in the right direction." Id. The Roundtable specifically endorsed the
"notice-inquiry" standard. Id. at 47. The comment to Tentative Draft No. 4 is considerably
more subdued than the comment to Tentative Draft No. 1 that was criticized by the Round-
table. Comment b to § 4.01(a)(1) in Tentative Draft No. 4 provides:
In many instances, the documentation and presentations related to the board's review
and approval of a major action will not raise significant questions and the board will be
able to act on the officers' recommendations without further inquiry. The board's ac-
tions would be entirely proper in these circumstances. Nothing in Subsection (a)(1) is
intended to encourage needless inquiries or the creation of burdensome paper records.
In other instances, an obligation to make inquiry might arise, but could be satisfied by
questions to officers about the ramifications of a major commitment. In still other in-
stances, discussions with inside or outside attorneys, auditors, or other experts, as well
as presentations by corporate officers, might be necessary.
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(1) comment b at 46.
Thus, the commentary to Tentative Draft No. 4, in contrast to the commentary to Ten-
tative Draft No. 1, allows the board to make many decisions without inquiry. According to
Tentative Draft No. 4, certain instances, but not "most instances," require inquiry as set
forth in Tentative Draft No. 1.
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when, but only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable director or
officer to the need therefore. The extent of such inquiry shall be such as the
director or officer reasonably believes to be necessary. 10 8
This change reduces the impact of the ALI Principles' original
duty of inquiry and is not intended to expand current corporation
law.
09
C. The Business Judgment Rule - Section 4.01(c)
Section 4.01(c) of the ALI Principles endeavors to codify the
business judgment rule." 0 At common law the business judgment
108. See Perkins, supra note 34, at 1206. The members of the ALI proposed this for-
mulation at their May 1985 meeting. This change has not been translated into a draft yet,
but, according to Perkins, is in essence a codification of the "red flag" test. Id.; see also
Veasey & Seitz, supra note 86, at 1504 (stating that "ihere is no doubt that the 1963
Graham court could have construed this [latest] provision as a 'red flag' test").
The ALI Reporters, however, specifically reject the Graham test, see supra note 106,
because Graham concerns a board of directors' failure to monitor the law compliance poli-
cies of the corporation. The Reporters interpret the Graham test to permit a "passive" role
for the board with respect to this dimension of oversight. In comment c the Reporters assert
that "[t]oday, an ordinarily prudent person serving as the director of a corporation of any
significant scale or complexity should recognize the need to be reasonably concerned with
the existence and effectiveness of programs or procedures . . .to assist the board in its
oversight role." T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(1) comment c at 48.
In fact, § 4.01(b) of Tentative Draft No. 1 explicitly codified the duty "to be reasonably
concerned with the existence and effectiveness of monitoring programs, including law com-
pliance programs." Although not incorporated in black-letter text, Tentative Draft No. 4
maintains the position that it is necessary for the board of directors to institute law compli-
ance procedures. See Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard - Safe Harbor or Uncharted
Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard Case compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus.
LAw. 919, 930 (1980) (asserting that "the expected role of a director has grown to include
the installation of legal compliance systems" and that this growth merely is an evolution of
the "ordinary prudent director's duties") (cited in comment c). But see Arsht & Hinsey,
Codified Standard - Safe Harbor But Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. Law. ix, xv
(1980) (arguing that in the law compliance context "[a]bsent known facts which should have
alerted [the director] to a condition which warranted his investigation, he had no duty of
inquiry") (endorsed by the Business Roundtable, see Rountable Statement, supra note 7, at
46); Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L.
Rav. 223, 241 (1983) (arguing that law compliance obligations do not increase a director's
duties under existing law).
Thus, even though the May 1985 codification is closer to the "red flag" test, it still
imposes an affirmative duty to inquire. The duty, however, arises in much more limited
circumstances. In contrast, the Graham test requires no duty to "ferret out wrongdoing."
Despite the May 1985 codification's apparent consistency with current case law, its imposi-
tion of an affirmative duty may demand greater inquiry by directors than present law
requires.
109. See T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a)(1) comment a at 45 (stating that "subsec-
tion (a)(1) adds no substantive principles to the first paragraph of subsection (a) and does
not expand the obligation that already exists under current law"); see also Perkins, supra
note 34, at 1206-07.
110. Section 4.01(c) provides:
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rule encompassed a number of concepts, including:
(a) the absence of personal interest or self-dealing,
(b) an informed decision, which reflects a reasonable effort (subject to
permitted reliance upon the advice and efforts of others) to become familiar
with the relevant and available facts, as well as an actual decision,
(c) a reasonable belief that the decision serves the interests of the corpo-
ration, and
(d) good faith.11" '
While section 4.01(c) includes each of these elements, some com-
mentators maintain that the ALI formulation is not an accurate
restatement of the common-law business judgment rule.112 Because
the ALI Principles focus on a deliberative decision, the Business
Roundtable asserts that the "deliberative" requirement 1 3 narrows
the scope of the business judgment rule's protection. 11 4 Moreover,
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his duty
under this Section if:
(1) he is not interested ... in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the ex-
tent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c).
111. Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Gov-
ernance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 610
(1984) (footnotes omitted). Mr. Hinsey cites Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d
Cir. 1980) (absence of self-dealing), Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (in-
formed decision), and Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (in
the corporation's interest and good faith) for each proposition in his common-law formula-
tion. See also Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Stan-
dards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REV. 591, 602-07;
supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
112. See Roundtable Statement, supra note 7, at 48 (arguing that although each pro-
vision of the rule is based on the common law, because of the commentary and the separa-
tion of the business judgment rule from the duty of care, "the sum is greater than the
parts").
113. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 1289 (arguing that shareholders do not benefit from
increased decisionmaking requirements because directors will be forced to incur substantial
costs in gathering information and documenting their decisions even though an unduly de-
liberative process may not be warranted).
114. The Business Roundtable asserts that the "informed decision" requirement as-
sumes that an affirmative decision in fact has been made. Roundtable Statement, supra
note 7, at 48. It is important to note, however, that most current commentary is focused on
either Tentative Draft No. 1 or Tentative Draft No. 3. Regarding the business judgment
rule, the actual codification of Tentative Draft No. 4 is not substantially different from that
of Tentative Draft No. 1 or Tentative Draft No. 3, but the rewording of the reliance provi-
sions in Tentative Draft No. 4 and its relation to the business judgment rule has helped to
alleviate directors' exposure to liability in non-decisionmaking contexts. See infra notes 133-
40. In fact, Geoffrey Hazard, Director of the ALI, states in the Foreword to Tentative Draft
No. 4 that:
Since sound business practice on the part of directors and executives entails abstention
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the requirement that directors have a "rational basis" for their de-
cision also has received a great deal of comment.'15 Finally, some
critics assert that the business judgment rule simply should not be
codified. 1
The ALI Principles' business judgment rule, as codified in sec-
tion 4.01(c), contains four distinct elements. First, a director must
act in good faith.17 This concept, however, remains murky because
"good faith" means an absence of self-interest to some, while
others consider it the equivalent of due diligence."' The ALI Prin-
ciples do not specify the extent to which good faith requires due
diligence. Rather, section 4.01(c) simply cites good faith as a pre-
as well as engagement, the principle of the business judgment rule should apply as
much to decisions to abstain as it does to engagement. Expressing this concept has
entailed difficulties both in verbal formulation and in relating the formulation to the
language of the decided cases. Traditional formulations of the business judgment rule
tend to focus on decisionmaking, and at times suggest that a decision to act is a neces-
sary predicate of the business judgment rule. If the business judgment rule once had
such limited scope, it no longer should. At the same time, the legal responsibilities of
directors and high level management do not permit abstention to degenerate into
abdication.
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, Foreword at x. The Roundtable's comments on Tentative Draft
No. 1 specifically chastise the ALI formulation for not protecting a director's discretion to
decide "what is important and what is not-including what needs to be 'monitored' and
what does not, what needs 'further inquiry' and what does not." Roundtable Statement,
supra note 7, at 48. Tentative Draft No. 4 addresses this concern.
The "deliberative decision" also might encourage shareholder strike suits because it is
relatively easy to state a cause of action against directors for failing to inform themselves of
material information, while dismissing such a claim is much more difficult without a trial on
the merits. Weiss, supra note 7, at 15.
115. See infra notes 127-32. One commentator notes a discrepancy between the re-
quirement of §§ 4.01(a) and 4.01(c) of Tentative Draft No. 2 that a director "reasonably"
believe the decision is in the best interests of the corporation, and § 4.01(c)(3)'s requirement
of a "rational" basis for the decision. Tentative Draft No. 4 contains a similar dichotomy: §
4.01(a) requires a "reasonable" belief, while § 4.01(c)(3) adopts the "rationality" test. As
Veasey and Seitz put it, "[s]trange porridge, indeed!" Veasey & Seitz, supra note 86, at
1497.
116. Veasey and Seitz conclude in their article:
Codification is not necessarily an improvement over decisional law . . . . Although
clarification and certainty are noble goals of codification, such goals may be elusive
because courts need to use elastic phrases to permit them to hold what they are result-
driven to hold in a given case. Mischief may be created by the use of new terms and
concepts.
Veasey & Seitz, supra note 86, at 1505.
117. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c).
118. See Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 615,
620 (1984) (noting that good faith to some means simply that the director's heart was
"pure;" to others, good faith would not be found if a director failed to attend board meet-
ings, inquire into suspicious circumstances, and do the necessary work associated with the
job).
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requisite for application of the business judgment rule." 9
Second, section 4.01(c)(1) requires that a director to be "disin-
terested.'120 Section 1.15 states that a director or officer is "inter-
ested" if the director or officer is a party to the transaction, or if
any associate or family member has a pecuniary interest in the
transaction. 12 1 Section 4.01(c)(1) is particularly important in take-
over situations because a director or officer might be a party to the
transaction and have a pecuniary interest in the transaction.
22
The third and most important requirement is set forth in sec-
tion 4.01(c)(2), which demands an informed, deliberative decision.
119. The Proposals do provide that there is a "good faith" limitation on a director's
ability to cause a corporation to violate the law. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c) comment
d at 64. Furthermore, "good faith" includes the duty to perform the functions within the
purview of § 2.01, which allows a corporation sometimes to forego immediate pecuniary
gains in order to enhance long-term profits. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(a) comment d
at 20-23; see also Hansen, supra note 7, at 1248-50. Mr. Hansen asserts that besides the
subjective "good faith" component, there are three additional elements of good faith: (1) a
director's disinterest; (2) absence of egregious conduct; (3) and independence. Mr. Hansen
argues that a director does not act in good faith if any of these elements are not fulfilled.
120. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c)(1). The rationale behind this requirement is
that the business judgment rule should not be applied to violations of the duty of loyalty.
Once a plaintiff shows that a director or officer was interested in the transaction, the burden
shifts to the director or officer to prove that the transaction was "fair and reasonable to the
corporation." Id. § 4.01(c)(1) comment d at 63; see also infra notes 188-92 and accompany-
ing text.
121. Section 1.15 provides:
(1) A director ... or officer ... is "interested" in a transaction if:
(a) the director or officer is party to the transaction, or
(b) the director or officer or an associate . . . of the director or officer has a
pecuniary interest in the transaction, or the director or officer has a financial or
familial relationship to a party to the transaction, that is sufficiently substantial
that it would reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment
with respect to the transaction in a manner adverse to the corporation.
T.D. No. 2, supra note 1, § 1.15.
122. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1197-99. Easterbrook and Fischel
note that one objective of the acquiring corporation usually is to replace existing manage-
ment. This creates an inherent conflict of interest. Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that
the business judgment rule should not protect the target management's defensive tactics,
even if such tactics indirectly benefit shareholders by driving up share prices. Id. at 1198-99;
see also Note, Target Directors' Fiduciary Duties: An Initial Reasonableness Burden, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722, 727 (1986) (acknowledging that most courts do not examine target
management's substantive decisions in confronting a takeover, but arguing that the board
should have to show that it responded reasonably and in the shareholders' best interest);
Subak, Takeovers: Where Are We? Where Do We Go?, 41 Bus. LAW. 1255, 1261 (1986) (stat-
ing that "the decision-making role of directors changes substantially when the issue goes to
the ownership of the corporation rather than its ongoing business" and that this dichotomy
is not addressed in the ALI).
The ALI will discuss the relationship between the business judgment rule and hostile
takeovers in Part VI: Transactions in Control, which should be released in the near future.
Perkins, supra note 34, at 1220-21.
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This provision requires a director to become informed "to the ex-
tent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circum-
stances."12 Thus, section 4.01(c)(2) holds directors' and officers'
decisionmaking process to a due care standard.12 This purely sub-
jective standard differs from the objective test articulated by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.12 5 Roswell Per-
kins and the ALI Reporters favor the ALI's formulation for pre-
cisely this reason. 2'
The fourth component of the ALI Principles' business judg-
ment rule is the "rationality" test set forth in section 4.01(c)(3).
127
By using the word "rational" instead of "reasonable," the ALI Re-
porters intended to create an easier standard of validity for the
decision. 28 The Business Roundtable, however, argues that a "ra-
tional basis" test will create problems by allowing courts to ex-
amine the merits of the business decision.129 The ALI Reporters
123. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c)(2).
124. Id. comment e at 64 (stating that "an informed decision is a prerequisite to the
legal insulation afforded by the business judgment rule"). But see Scott, supra note 7, at
933-35 (discussing the ALI's "active" model of monitoring and arguing that the requirement
of outside directors is likely to result in less informed corporate decisions).
125. See supra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes 48-86 and accompanying
text; see also Hansen, supra note 7, at 1249-50 & n.57. Hansen asserts that in Smith v. Van
Gorkom the Trans Union directors were found liable not because they were not informed to
the extent they "reasonably believed to be appropriate under the circumstances" under the
language of § 4.01(c)(2), but because they did not meet the objective standards of the court.
While Hansen does not endorse either standard, he asserts that it is not the province of the
ALI to "advance a recommended change in the law in the guise of codification." Id. at 1250
& n.57.
126. See Perkins, supra note 34, at 1212. The objective test, as articulated in Van
Gorkom, fails to consider that directors frequently work under extreme time pressure and
may not need extensive investigation to familiarize themselves with a subject. Furthermore,
the "all material information reasonably available to them" standard provides no clear
guideline for determining when a director is reasonably informed. For a discussion of the
time constraints on directors, see infra note 136 (T.D. No. 4 comment e).
127. See T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(c)(3).
128. Comment d to Tentative Draft No. 4 § 4.01 states that:
This standard is intended to provide directors and officers with a wide ambit of discre-
tion. It is recognized that the word "rational," which is widely used by courts, has a
close etymological tie to the word "reasonable" and that, at times, the words have been
used almost interchangeably. But a sharp distinction is being drawn between the words
here. The phrase "rationally believes" is intended to permit a significantly wider range
of discretion than the term "reasonable," and to give a director or officer a safe harbor
from liability for business judgments that might arguably fall outside the term "reason-
able" but are not so removed from the realm of reason when made that liability should
be incurred.
Id. § 4.01 comment d at 10-11.
129. Although some courts have stated that the business judgment rule will apply only
if the decision has a "rational basis," the Business Roundtable notes that other courts have
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justify the rational basis test by arguing that a "good faith only"
test would provide too safe a harbor. 30 The Reporters assert that
there is no reason to protect "an objectively irrational business de-
cision"-one so removed from the realm of reason that it should
not be sustained solely on the basis that it was made in subjective
good faith."'' Others argue that despite the ALI's intention to ex-
clude only "off-the-wall" or "wildly irresponsible" decisions, inno-
vation in American business often thrives on "off-the-wall"
proposals. 132
Scholars and practitioners have debated whether section
4.01(c) protects a decision not to act.' 3 Roswell Perkins finds the
answer in section 4.01(b), which governs directors' right to delegate
their functions. 134 Section 4.01(b) of Tentative Draft No. 4 states
that "the board may delegate, formally or informally by course of
conduct, any function. . . to committees of the board or to direc-
tors, officers, employees, experts, or other persons."'1 5 A director
arguably could satisfy the duty of care by delegating specific func-
tions to an executive who the director reasonably believed was
trustworthy.136 Section 4.01(b) interacts with sections 4.02 and
precluded any review whatsoever of the decision's merits. Roundtable Statement, supra
note 7, at 49. Courts generally presume that directors and officers have acted in good faith
and with due diligence if a business decision in fact has been made. See supra An Historical
Perspective (Special Project) note 61 and accompanying text. The Roundtable asserts that
§ 4.01(c)(3) requires inquiry into the substantive decision in every case. Furthermore, the
Roundtable feels it is unnecessary to incorporate the "rational basis" test into the business
judgment rule in order to impose liability when a director or officer has made "an objec-
tively irrational business decision." The Rountable asserts that if a director has acted so
egregiously, the decision could not have been one reasonably believed to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation. Thus, any inquiry as to a decision's rational basis is unnecessary.
Roundtable Statement, supra note 7, at 49.
130. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.02(c) comment f at 69 (stating that "courts that
have articulated only a 'good faith' test provide too much legal insulation for directors and
officers").
131. Id.
132. Manning, supra note 118, at 622 (noting that "[m]any inventions, industrial inno-
vations, and discoveries, whether ultimately successful or unsuccessful, have been consid-
ered 'off-the-wall' when first proposed").
133. Manning, supra note 54, at 1484. Mr. Manning argues that the most important
decisions concern choosing the issues to put on the board's agenda:
From among an infinite number of useful things that a board of directors might reason-
ably have done or looked into in a given time period, the number that will not have
been done by the most qualified, best-run, and most diligent board in the world will
always be far greater than the number that were done.
Id. at 1485 (emphasis in original).
134. Perkins, supra note 34, at 1208.
135. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(b).
136. Comment b to Tentative Draft No. 4 § 4.01(b) provides:
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4.03, which govern a director's or officer's right to rely on the direc-
tors, officers, and employees of the corporation, as well as its law-
yers, its accountants, and committees of the board.117 To qualify
The board (or a committee) may also generally instruct a senior executive . . . to re-
port to it major "trouble spots" related to his area of responsibility. In the absence of
suspicious circumstances or other unusual facts indicating that reliance is unwarranted
• . . the board would be reasonable in assuming that silence indicated that everything
was progressing satisfactorily. . . . When a director acts in "good faith" and "reasona-
bly believes" that reliance is warranted, the director is entitled to rely on the senior
executive . . . Of course, directors cannot simply delegate away all of their oversight
obligations. Under § 4.01, which is consistent with section 42 of the Model Act and the
common law on the subject, the board must retain ultimate responsibility for oversee-
ing the conduct of the corporation's business.
T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.01(b) comment b at 56.
Comment e to Tentative Draft No. 4 § 4.01(b) provides:
Some business decisions must, for example, be made under severe time pressure while
others afford time for the orderly marshalling of material information. Section
4.01(c)(2) permits the director or officer to take into account the time that is realisti-
cally available in deciding the extent to which he should be informed. The time realisti-
cally available may involve risk taking, which includes the risk of not having all rele-
vant facts concerning a proposed transaction as well as the risks related to the
economic consequences of the transaction itself. A decision to accept the risk of incom-
plete information, so long as the director reasonably believes such informational risk
taking to be appropriate under the circumstances, will be fully consistent with the ap-
plication of the business judgment rule to decisions made with respect to the principal
transaction.
Id. comment e.
In comment c to Tentative Draft No. 4 § 4.02, the ALI Reporters address whether a
director is "entitled to rely" on other people and reports. The comment states that reliance
is simply one element to consider in analyzing the defendants' good faith or exercise of due
care. If the only issue is reliance and the director fulfills the requirements of § 4.01(b), the
director will have a complete defense. Tentative Draft No. 4, supra note 1, § 4.02 comment c
at 78-79. Comment f to Tentative Draft No. 4 § 4.02 explains that the "reasonably believes
merit confidence" formulation requires only that the director or officer have a reasonable
belief that the delegatee "has the ability to do a satisfactory job with respect to the matter
in question." Id. § 4.02 comment f at 82.
137. Tentative Draft No. 4 § 4.02 states:
In performing his duty and functions, a director or officer who acts in good faith, and
reasonably believes that his reliance is warranted, is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports, statements (including financial statements and other financial data),
and decisions, judgments, or performance (including decisions, judgments, or perform-
ance within the scope of § 4.01(b)), in each case prepared, presented, made or per-
formed by:
(a) One or more directors, officers, or employees of the corporation, or of a business
organization . . . under joint control or common control. . . whom the director or of-
ficer reasonably believes merit confidence; or
(b) Legal Counsel, public accountants, engineers, or other persons whom the direc-
tor or officer reasonably believes merit confidence.
Id. § 4.02.
Tentative Draft No. 4 § 4.03 states:
In performing his duty and functions, a director who acts in good faith, and reasonably
believes that his reliance is warranted, is entitled to rely on:
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for the protection provided by sections 4.02 and 4.03, a director or
officer138 must be reasonably confident that any individual on
whom the director or officer relies is competent to handle the
job.3 ' Furthermore, a director's lapse in oversight might constitute
"informal" delegation and reliance.
140
In sum, the ALI's codification of the duty of care and the busi-
ness judgment rule remains controversial even though Tentative
Draft No. 4 marks its third publication. First, codification of the
duty of care in section 4.01 provides for an ordinary negligence
standard14 ' even though many scholars and practitioners argue
that a gross negligence standard represents the true majority com-
mon-law view. 42 Second, section 4.01(a)(1)'s duty of inquiry provi-
sion has been changed to resemble a red flag test;43 nevertheless,
the ALI Reporters reject Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, which im-
poses no duty except in suspicious circumstances.'4 Instead, the
ALI Reporters impose a duty of inquiry "when. . .circumstances
would alert a reasonable director or officer.' 45 This formulation
will shift the burden of inquiry to the director in all borderline
situations. Finally, the ALI Principles' codification of the business
(a) The decisions, judgments, or performance (including decisions, judgments, or
performance within the scope of § 4.01(b)), of a duly authorized committee of the
board upon which the director does not serve, with respect to matters properly dele-
gated to that committee, provided that the director reasonably believes the committee
merits confidence.
(b) Information, opinions, reports, or statements (incuding financial statements
and other financial data), in each case prepared or presented by a duly authorized
committee of the board upon which the director does not serve, provided that the di-
rector reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
Id. § 4.03.
138. Under the ALI Principles, officers, as well as directors, are entitled to the protec-
tion of § § 4.01(b), 4.02, and 4.03. Because an officer is expected to be more familiar with the
internal affairs of the corporation, the Revised Model Act is more restrictive in the extent to
which it allows officers to rely on information, reports, or statements. The ALI Reporters,
however, assert that the use of the "reasonable belief" language provides enough flexibility
to decide whether the officer's reliance was indeed warranted and that the complexities of
the large, modern corporation require that an officer be allowed to rely on other people and
information. See id. § 4.02 comment d at 79-80.
139. Perkins, supra note 34, at 1207-09.
140. See id. at 1207-09 (arguing that § 4.01(b) might classify a mild lapse in oversight
as an "informal" delegation); see also Hansen, supra note 7, at 1247 (noting that current
case law imposes liability in the non-decisionmaking context only upon a showing of egre-
gious facts).
141. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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judgment rule remains controversial even though the four require-
ments in section 4.01(c) all are based, in part, in the common
law. 146 Commentators argue that the specific language of each re-
quirement potentially could decrease protection for directors and
officers.14 7 In certain instances, such as the required structuring of
the corporation as outlined in Chapter III and the subjective test
for the "reasonably informed" requirement in section 4.01(c)(2),
the ALI has proposed blatant changes to the common law. Other
provisions, such as the duty of inquiry in section 4.01(a)(1) and the
qualifications for protection by the business judgment rule in sec-
tion 4.01(c), do not blatantly change the common law, but arguably
decrease protection for directors and officers. These changes high-
light a controversy surrounding the ALI Proposals-whether it is
proper for an institution of such power and prestige, whose prior
restatements generally carry the force of law, to codify corporation
law in a manner inconsistent with present interpretations of the
common law.148 Courts already have begun to cite the ALI Propos-
als despite their nonrestatement character.'4" Arguably, the ALI
should limit its efforts to codification of established case law and
allow the natural evolution of judicial authority to resolve the
multi-faceted corporate governance debate.
V. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
At its April 1986 meeting the ALI adopted a new draft con-
cerning directors' and officers' duty of loyalty to the corporation. 150
146. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 117-40 and accompanying text.
148. See Roundtable Statement, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that "[m]ost troublesome,
in these circumstances, is the fact that the Reporters have presented their proposals in a
document which carries the hallmark of a traditional Restatement").
149. See Hansen Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir.
1986); Fitzpatrick v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 765 F.2d 569, 576 (6th Cir. 1985).
150. For a discussion of the duty of loyalty at common law and in the Revised Model
Act, see supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 115-40 and accompanying
text, and Revised Model Act (Special Project) notes 99-158 and accompanying text. In the
ALI Proposals, the duty of loyalty is addressed primarily in §§ 5.01 and 5.02, which state:
§ 5.01 Duty of Loyalty of Directors, Senior Executives, and Dominating Shareholders
Directors, senior executives, and dominating shareholders have a duty of loyalty
that requires each of them, when personally interested in a matter affecting the corpo-
ration, to deal fairly with the corporation, as provided in Chapters 2 and 3 of Part V.
This duty includes the obligation to make appropriate disclosure as provided in such
chapters.
§ 5.02 Transactions with the Corporation
(a) General Rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a transaction with
the corporation (other than a transaction involving the payment of compensation) ful-
1987]
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The ALI typically issues a statement that is far more specific than
existing statutory law. Part V of the ALI Principles is no excep-
tion. 5" While most states statutes are silent 152 on issues such as
burden of proof, compensation to senior executives and directors,
transactions between corporations with common directorates, the
corporate opportunity doctrine, use of corporate information, and
competition between directors and officers and the corporation, the
ALI Principles address each of these issues.
Of the provisions addressing the duty of loyalty, section 5.02
has received the most discussion. 15 Unlike most state statutes, the
ALI's codification begins with an attempt to define the duty of loy-
alty.15 4 Under section 5.02 the duty of loyalty applies to a "director
fills his duty of loyalty to the corporation with respect to the transaction if:
(1) disclosure concerning the conflict of interest ... and the transaction ... is
made to the corporate decisionmaker . . who authorizes or ratifies the transaction;
and
(2) (A) the transaction is fair to the corporation when entered into; or
(B) the transaction is authorized, following such disclosure, by disinterested
directors. ..and could reasonably be believed to be fair to the corporation at the
time of such authorization; or
(C) the transaction is authorized or ratified, following such disclosure, by
disinterested shareholders. . . and does not constitute a waste of corporate assets
• ..at the time of the shareholder action.
(b) Burden of Proof; Ratification of Defective Disclosure. A party who challenges a
transaction betweeen a director or senior executive and the corporation has the burden
of proof, except that the director or the senior executive has the burden of proving that
the transaction is fair to the corporation if the transaction was not authorized by disin-
terested directors, or authorized or ratified by disinterested shareholders, following dis-
closure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction. The disclosure require-
ments of § 5.02(a)(1) will be deemed to be satisfied if at any time (but no later than a
reasonable time after suit is filed challenging the transaction) the transaction is rati-
fied, following such disclosure, by the board, the shareholders, or the corporate deci-
sionmaker who initially approved the transaction or his successor.
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, §§ 5.01-5.02.
Many of the terms in these sections are defined within the ALI Principles. See, e.g.,
§ 1.09(a) (defining "conflict of interest"); § 1.09(b) (defining "transaction"); § 1.11 (defining
"disinterested shareholder"); § 1.34 (defining "waste of corporate assets").
151. Sommer, The Duty of Loyalty in The ALI's Corporate Governance Project, 52
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 719, 726-27 (1984).
152. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 121-29 and accompa-
nying text.
153. See Perkins, supra note 34, at 1218 (stating that "[slection 5.02, the section of
Part V which has been the focus of most discussion. . . governs generally the situation of a
director or senior executive entering into a transaction . . . with the corporation").
154. See Sommer, supra note 152, at 726 (commenting on Tentative Draft No. 3's
articulation of the duty of loyalty). The section parallel to § 5.02 in Tentative Draft No. 3 is
§ 5.08. Section 5.08 of Tentative Draft No. 3 states what would be considered a violation of
the duty of loyalty. Conversely, the Tentative Draft No. 5 formulation states what a would
not be considered a violation. The basic proposals of the provision, however, remain the
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or senior executive who enters into a transaction with the corpora-
tion."' 5 The definition of an "interested" director for purposes of
Part V has been revised in section 1.18.156 While the new definition
is essentially the same as the definition in section 1.15 of Tentative
Draft No. 1,157 a director now is "interested" if the director is
"subject to a controlling influence by" a party to the transaction. 58
Section 5.02 encompasses most types of transactions between di-
rectors and officers and the corporation."6 9 It does not apply, how-
same. Mr. Sommer, a former Chairman of the SEC, notes that most state statutes simply
provide which types of transactions might be voidable. See also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT § 8.31; supra Revised Model Act (Special Project) note 103.
155. T.D. No. 4, supra note 1, § 5.02(a). Section 5.02(a) does not apply to a disinter-
ested director who approved a transaction between an interested director and the corpora-
tion. The Introductory Note to Part V provides:
Part V is not concerned with the standard of conduct or liability of directors, senior
executives, and shareholders who are not personally interested in a matter affecting the
corporation. Part V is therefore inapplicable to disinterested directors who authorize a
transaction involving interested directors. The conduct of the disinterested directors in
such a case is governed by the standards set forth in Part IV.
156. Section 1.18 provides:
(a) A director . . . or officer is "interested" in a transaction if:
(1) The director or officer is a party to the transaction, or
(2) The director or officer or an associate . . . of the director or officer has a
pecuniary interest in the transaction, or the director or officer has a financial or
familial relationship with, or is subject to a controlling influence by, a party to the
transaction, that in each instance is sufficiently substantial that it would reasona-
bly be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment with respect to the
transaction in a manner adverse to the corporation.
(b) A shareholder is interested in a transaction if either the shareholder or, to his
knowledge, an associate of the shareholder is a party to the transaction or the share-
holder is also an interested director with respect to the same transaction.
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 1.18.
157. See supra note 121.
158. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 1.18. According to the comment to § 1.18, the concept
of "interested" should be distinguished from the "significant relationship" and "associate
concepts." "Interested" applies when a director is involved in a particular transaction or is
related to an involved party, while the "significant relationship" provision defines who is an
inside or outside director. An officer who is also a director, but who is subordinate to a
senior executive interested in the transaction, is presumed to be interested in the transac-
tion. A corporation is not required to determine whether shareholders are "interested" in a
transaction. If, however, the corporation endeavors to determine the "interest" of sharehold-
ers, the test is more narrow than that for directors and officers. The comment also provides
that a court may determine that in certain circumstances a constructive "familial relation-
ship" exists even though the parties are not related by blood or marriage. Finally, the com-
ment provides that a court may set aside a transaction that appears to have had disinter-
ested board approval if the transaction was "controlled" in fact by an interested director.
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 1.18 comment a at 8-9.
159. Comment c to § 5.02 provides:
[S]uch dealing would include supplying property to the corporation or acquiring prop-
erty from the corporation, by sale, lease or otherwise, furnishing services to the corpo-
ration in some capacity other than as a director or senior executive (such as an invest-
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ever, to a director's usurpation of a corporate opportunity160 or to
ment advisor, investment banker, or attorney), supplying or acquiring services from the
corporation, or making loans to or receiving loans from the corporation.
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02 comment c at 28.
-160. Section 5.05 specifically addresses the corporate opportunity doctrine. Section
5.05 provides:
(a) General Rule. A director . . . or senior executive ... may not take advantage
of a corporate opportunity unless:
(1) he first offers the corporate opportunity to the corporation and makes dis-
closure concerning the conflict of interest. . . and the facts concerning the corpo-
rate opportunity . ..
(2) the corporate opportunity is rejected by the corporation; and
(3) (A) the rejection of the opportunity is fair to the corporation; or
(B) the rejection is authorized, following such disclosure, by disinter-
ested directors .. . in a manner that satisfies the standards of the business
judgment rule . . . or
(C) the rejection is authorized or ratified by disinterested shareholders
... following such disclosure, and the shareholders' action is not
equivalent to a waste of corporate assets ....
(b) Definition of a Corporate Opportunity. For purposes of this section, a corpo-
rate opportunity means:
(1) any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a director or
senior executive becomes aware either:
(A) in connection with the performance of his functions as a director or
senior executive, or under circumstances that should reasonably lead him to
believe that the person offering the opportunity expects him to offer it to
the corporation; or
(B) through the use of corporate information or property, if the result-
ing opportunity is one that the director or senior executive should reasona-
bly be expected to believe would be of interest to the corporation; or
(2) any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a senior execu-
tive becomes aware, if he knows or reasonably should know that the activity is
closely related to the business in which the corporation is engaged or may reasona-
bly be expected to engage.
A "business activity" includes the acquisition or use of any contract right or other
tangible or intangible property.
Id. § 5.05.
Section 5.05(c), not reprinted here, provides that the burden of proof shall be much the
same as under § 5.02(b), which provides that the burden of proof shifts from the challenger
to the director or officer in the absence of director or shareholder authorization.
The common law has adopted a number of positions. See supra An Historical Perspec-
tive (Special Project) note 126. According to comment a to § 5.05, some courts have consid-
ered only whether the opportunity fell in the corporation's line of business. Other courts
have evaluated the director's seizure of the opportunity under a general standard of fairness.
Still other courts have combined these elements using a "two-step" test - first applying a
"line of business" test and, if the opportunity is in the corporation's business, then deciding
whether it is fair to require the director or officer to give up the opportunity in favor of the
corporation. Section 5.04 encompasses any opportunity that is advantageous to the corpora-
tion and requires a senior executive to offer it first to the corporation. Outside directors will
be governed by a less stringent test. See generally T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.05 comment
at 107; id. § 5.05(a)-(d) comments.
The ALI has codified separately in § 5.04 a director's or officer's duties concerning use
of corporate position, nonpublic information about the corporation, and corporate property.
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transactions involving compensation. 6 1 Likewise, section 5.02 does
These concepts generally are discussed in cases concerning
misuse of position for a variety of purposes, including securing an undisclosed commis-
sion, obtaining a tax benefit at the expense of the corporation, manipulating the corpo-
ration's dividend policy for personal objectives, precluding the corporation from engag-
ing in a profitable business activity so that the director or senior executive may do so,
and securing a benefit in connection with a director's resigning from office. Some cases
involve harm to the corporation or misuse of inside information in connection with
transactions in the corporation's stock. Some cases involve use of corporate property
for personal benefit.
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.04 commentary at 69-70.
Section 5.04 attempts to incorporate the holdings of each of these cases. This section
provides that a director or senior executive, unless the director or senior executive pays the
fair market value for any benefit received, must provide full disclosure and obtain proper
approval before using corporate property, information, or position to obtain a pecuniary
benefit. Id. at 67-104.
Finally, in § 5.06 the ALI Proposals address the circumstances under which a director
or senior executive may compete with the corporation. Section 5.06 generally provides that a
director or senior executive may not compete with the corporation in order to advance per-
sonal wealth unless: (1) any "reasonably forseeable harm" to the corporation is outweighed
by the benefits of the competition; (2) no harm comes to the corporation; or (3) the competi-
tion is ratified by disinterested directors in a manner that satisfies the business judgment
rule or by shareholders if the shareholders actions do not constitute waste. See id. § 5.06
commentary at 125-35.
161. Transactions involving compensation are dealt with in § 5.03, which provides:
(a) General Rule. A director . . . or senior executive . . . who receives compensa-
tion from the corporation for services in that capacity fulfills his duty of loyalty to the
corporation with respect to the compensation if:
(1) disclosure concerning the transaction. . . is made to the corporate deci-
sionmaker. . . who authorizes or ratifies the compensation; and
(2) (A) the compensation is fair to the corporation when approved; or
(B) the compensation is authorized, following disclosure concerning
the transaction, by disinterested directors . . . in a manner that sat-
isfies the standards of the business judgment rule . . . or
(C) the compensation is authorized or ratified, following such disclo-
sure, by disinterested shareholders . . . and does not constitute a
waste of corporate assets . . . at the time of the shareholder action.
(b) Burden of Proof; Ratifications of Defective Disclosure. A party who challenges
a transaction involving the payment of compensation to a director or senior executive
has the burden of proof, except that the director or the senior executive has the burden
of proving that the transaction is fair to the corporation if the transaction was not
authorized by disinterested directors, or authorized or ratified by disinterested share-
holders, following such disclosure. The disclosure requirements of § 5.03(a)(1) will be
deemed to be satisfied if at any time (but no later than a reasonable time after suit is
filed challenging the transaction) the transaction is ratified, following such disclosure,
by the board, the shareholders, or the corporate decision-maker who initially approved
the transaction or his successor.
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.03.
The Reporters felt that a less stringent test was necessary for compensation payments
because compensation for directors and senior executives must be determined in all cases.
In most conflict of interest transactions, however, the deal can be avoided. Compensation
generally is well publicized, and the process for determining compensation is widely institu-
tionalized. Thus, any disadvantage to the corporation is unlikely. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1,
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not apply" 2 if the transaction involves goods or services that gen-
erally are offered to the public on fixed terms, or if the transaction
was determined by competitive 63 bids.
Once a senior executive, director, or shareholder meets section
1.18's definition of "interested," certain information16 4 must be dis-
closed to the corporate decisionmaker concerning the transaction
and the conflict of interest.'65 The duty to make adequate disclo-
sure is much the same as in state statutes."6 Under the ALI ap-
proach, however, a failure to disclose is in itself a breach of the
duty of loyalty.1
6 7
At common law the minority approach was to void transac-
tions in which the interested director or officer did not fully dis-
close the conflict of interest to the corporation. 6 s The common
law's main concern, however, was whether the transaction was fair
§ 5.03 comment c at 59.
162. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02 comment c at 29.
163. A valid competition, free of sharp dealing or other devices, must have occurred
before awarding of the bid. Id. at 28-29.
164. "Disclosure Concerning a Conflict of Interest" is satisfied under § 1.09 if there is
disclosure to the corporate decisionmaker of "the material facts known to him concerning
the conflict of interest, or if at the time the transaction is approved, the corporate deci-
sionmaker knows of those facts." "Disclosure Concerning a Transaction" is defined as a
disclosure to the corporate decisionmaker of "the material facts known to him concerning
the transaction." T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 1.09 at 3.
165. Section 5.02(a) provides:
(a) General rule. A director or senior executive who enters into a transaction with
the corporation (other than a transaction involving a payment of compensation) fulfills
his duty of loyalty to the corporation with respect to the transaction if:
(1) disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the transaction is made
to the corporate decisionmaker who authorizes or ratifies the transaction ...
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(a).
166. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 121-24 and accompa-
nying text.
167. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(a)(1) comment a at 27. The comment states that
when faced with a reasonably fair transaction but inadequate disclosure, some courts have
stated that failure to make full disclosure is but one factor to consider in determining the
fairness of the transaction. Other courts, however, have found that a corporation may void a
transaction on the basis of inadequate disclosure alone. The Reporters adopt the latter view,
finding provisions in the Restatements of Agency, Contracts, Torts, and Restitution to the
effect that a director or officer is in a confidential relationship with the corporation and
must make full disclosure. Id. Furthermore, the comment to § 5.02(a)(1) (the disclosure
provision) states that a senior executive may not deal with the corporation as if at arm's
length. The senior executive has the duty to avoid misleading omissions and to reveal mate-
rial facts. This provision differs from the New York statute, which requires disclosure only
of the conflict, not of all material information regarding the transaction. See W. KLEIN & J.
COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 150 (1986).
168. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 118, 134, and accom-
panying text; see also supra note 167.
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to the corporation. If the transaction was fair, the majority of juris-
dictions would not void the transaction.""s Thus, the ALI Princi-
ples' proposal that a director's or officer's inadequate disclosure is
itself a breach of the duty of loyalty apparently departs from the
majority common-law view. The ALI approach also is more restric-
tive than the Revised Model Act, which would uphold a transac-
tion that was fair to the corporation and had been approved by
shareholders or disinterested directors.170 This heightened expo-
sure of directors and officers to liability for a breach of the duty of
loyalty' 7 ' is mitigated, however, by the last sentence of section
5.02(b), which allows a transaction to be ratified following a be-
lated disclosure by the interested party.
72
Section 5.02(a)(2) provides that a transaction will be valid
under section 5.02 only if one of the enumerated standards is met
and if the disclosure requirement of section 5.02(a)(1) has been ful-
filled.' In simple terms, the transaction must be (1) fair to the
corporation, (2) authorized by disinterested directors and reasona-
bly believed to be fair to the corporation, or (3) ratified by disin-
terested shareholders and determined not to constitute a waste of
169. See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality,
22 Bus. LAw. 35, 43 (1966).
170. See supra Revised Model Act (Special Project) notes 107-13 and accompanying
text. The Revised Model Act now requires a director to disclose all material facts concerning
the transaction, not just that a conflict of interest exists. This conforms with the ALI ap-
proach. See supra Revised Model Act (Special Project) note 108 (discussing § 8.31(a) of the
Revised Model Act).
171. Professor Weiss asserts that allowing shareholders to challenge the sufficiency of
management's disclosure was an effort by the ALI to "increase shareholder's opportunities
to challenge conflict-of-interest transactions." Weiss, supra note 7, at 19-20.
172. The relevant part of § 5.02(b) provides:
The disclosure requirements of § 5.02(a)(1) will be deemed to be satisfied if at any time
(but no later than a reasonable time after suit is filed challenging the transaction) the
transaction is ratified, following such disclosure, by the board, the shareholders, or the
corporate decisionmaker who initially approved the transaction or his successor.
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(b).
According to Roswell Perkins, this belated disclosure will not have the further effect of
shifting the burden of proof back to the plaintiff, which would have been the case with prior
disclosure. This belated disclosure can occur even after a complaint challenging the transac-
tion has been filed, although it must be within a reasonable time thereafter. The Reporters
do not say what constitutes a "reasonable" time. Mr. Perkins also notes that if a good faith
attempt to disclose occurred at the beginning, a subsequent remedying of the disclosure
probably will shift the burden of proof back to the plaintiff and narrow the scope of review.
See Perkins, supra note 34, at 1218-19; see also T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(b) comment
at 43.
173. These standards essentially determine the level of judicial scrutiny and place-
ment of the burden of proof. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(a)(2) comment at 33.
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corporate assets. 7 '
The requirement that the transaction be fair to the corpora-
tion is consistent with current case law.175 Section 8.31(a) of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides that the trans-
action will stand if it is fair or if it has been ratified by either dis-
interested directors or disinterested shareholders.176 This language
appears to provide that the transaction will be valid if any of the
three requirements is met; however, most jurisdictions interpreting
statutes based on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
have required fairness in all circumstances. 177 In determining fair-
ness, the ALI Reporters state that the test is an objective one in
which the transaction must come within a "range of reasonable-
ness." 178 Fairness will be judged at the time of the transaction, not
in light of subsequent events. 9
The second prong of section 5.02(a)(2) provides that the trans-
action will be upheld if it was authorized' 80 by disinterested direc-
174. Id. § 5.02(a)(2)(A)-(C).
175. See supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also Note, Section 21-2040.01:
Interested Director Transactions and Considerations of Fairness, 58 NEB. L. R-v. 909, 912-
17 (1979).
176. See supra Revised Model Act (Special Project) note 108 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Revised Model Act (Special Project) notes 109-10 and accompanying
text. The leading case in this area is Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal.
App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952), which did not preclude judicial review into the fairness of
the transaction despite disinterested director approval that fulfilled one element of Califor-
nia's statutory test. The California statute was based on the Revised Model Act. While some
commentators argue that the Revised Model Act requires that only one of these statutory
tests be met, the majority view allows further judicial scrutiny into the fairness of the trans-
action. See Note, supra note 175, at 914.
178. The Reporters cite Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 54 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981), in support of the "range of reasonableness"
test. The comment to § 5.02(a)(2)(A) states that:
[Iln determining fairness, the court may take into account the process by which the
transaction was shaped and approved (such as whether there was pressure on the cor-
porate decisionmaker who approved the transaction) and any objective indicators of
fairness of price (such as comparable transactions between parties dealing at arm's
length).
T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(a)(2)(A) comment at 34.
For a discussion of the "arm's length bargain test," see supra Revised Model Act (Spe-
cial Project) notes 119-125 and accompanying text. The comment to § 5.02(a)(2)(A) points
out that the decisionmaker should consider not only the transaction as if it had been at
arm's length, but also whether the transaction is in the best interests of the corporation.
The comment further asserts that if a disinterested director initiated the transaction, it is
more likely to be fair to the corporation. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(a)(2)(A) comment
at 34.
179. See supra note 178.
180. The Reporters omitted the word "ratified" from this prong because they believed
that once the transaction had been entered into, the corporation was not likely to strike a
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tors and if the transaction "could reasonably be believed to be fair
to the corporation at the time of such authorization. '181 The Busi-
ness Roundtable asserts that if disinterested directors authorized
the transaction, most state statutes would preclude judicial inquiry
into its fairness and would protect the directors' decision under the
business judgment rule.1 82 The ALI approach, however, requires a
higher standard than the business judgment rule because a "rea-
sonably believed" test is more rigorous than the "rationality" test
of section 4.01(c). 8 3 The "reasonably believed" test is not as strin-
gent as a determination of fairness under section 5.02(a)(2)(A),
however, because even if a court believes the transaction was un-
fair, if reasonable minds could differ as to the fairness of the trans-
action, the transaction still will be valid. 84
The third prong of section 5.02(a)(2) provides that the trans-
action will be upheld if there was authorization or ratification by
disinterested shareholders and the transaction does not constitute
a waste of corporate assets.18 5 Section 1.34 of Part V defines a
waste of corporate assets as a transaction in which " no person of
ordinary sound business judgment would say that the considera-
tion was a fair exchange for what was given by the corporation.
1' 8 6
favorable bargain. In essence, director "permission" is required. See T.D. No. 5, supra note
1, § 5.02(a)(2)(B) comment at 39.
181. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(a)(2)(B).
182. STATEMENT OF THE BusINEss ROUNDTABLE CONCERNING COUNCIL DRAFT No. 2
(Dec. 1983) [hereinafter December 1983 Roundtable Statement]. For the proposition that
all transactions will be reviewed for fairness in spite of statutory language, see supra note
177 and accompanying text
183. Perkins, supra note 34, at 1219. Mr. Perkins explains:
We know that courts will generally consider in a different light the board's (1) decision
to authorize a business transaction with a complete "outsider;" and (2) decision to au-
thorize a business transaction with one of the board members. Thus, § 5.02 in effect
takes the view that, so long as the threshold for potential liability of the disinterested
directors who approve the transaction is not lowered (which it is not, under § 5.02), it is
preferable to recognize the difference in the treatment a court will give to the two
situations and to reserve the very wide protection of the business judgment doctrine for
transactions wherein courts will be willing truly to give minimal scrutiny to the merits
of the transaction.
Id. at 1219; see also Scott, supra note 7, at 940 (stating that "[in loyalty analysis, there is
no proper place for the business judgment rule . . . [t]he court has much less reason to
defer to management determinations when their interests directly conflict with shareholder
interests").
184. Sommer, supra note 151, at 730.
185. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(a)(2)(C).
186. This provision adopts the Supreme Court of Delaware's test in Michelson v.
Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979). This test is to be applied at the time of ratification,
not at the time of trial. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 1.34 comment at 13.
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This provision does not depart from the common law. 187
The burden of proving fairness historically has fallen on the
interested director. 8 This is especially true if there was not disin-
terested director approval or disinterested shareholder ratifica-
tion.' The ALI formulation adopts this traditional approach, but
shifts the burden of proof to the challenging party if there has
been authorization by disinterested directors or ratification or au-
thorization by disinterested shareholders. 90 While this issue re-
mains unsettled,' 19 the Revised Model Act has been interpreted to
be consistent with the ALI approach. 92
While some critics complain that the ALI codification departs
from current case law and statutes,' other commentators assail
Part V for different reasons. Professor Weiss argues that the ALI's
dependence on independent director approval in conflict-of-inter-
est transactions is improvident because of the popular belief that
independent directors'94-especially when "independent" means
only a lack of pecuniary interest-are incapable of substantive ob-
jectivity. 95 Professor Weiss also notes that shareholders are
equally unlikely to provide a substantive check on management be-
187. Sommer, supra note 151, at 721 (citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del.
Ch. 82, 90-92, 90 A.2d 660,. 665 (1952)); see also Marsh, supra note 169, at 48 (stating that
shareholder ratification will validate a transaction absent fraud or unfairness and that a
"waste of corporate assets" would surely be "unfair"); T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, Reporter's
Note 6 at 54-55.
188. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
189. See Note, supra note 175, at 917-18.
190. T.D. No. 5, supra note 1, § 5.02(b).
191. See Note, supra note 175, at 917-20 (discussing conflicting developments in New
York, Iowa, Delaware, and New Jersey); see also Marsh, supra note 169, at 49-50 (asserting
that shareholder approval may shift the burden of proof to the one attacking the fairness of
the transaction). But see Weiss, supra note 7, at 24-25 (arguing that director approval
should not shift the burden of proof because an absence of pecuniary interest is not necessa-
rily indicative of complete objectivity).
192. See supra Revised Model Act (Special Project) notes 129-36 and accompanying
text.
193. Roundtable Comments, supra note 7, at 23 (stating that "[w]ith respect to Part
V (Duty of Loyalty), we believe that it represents a significant departure from existing law
- by requiring a fairness inquiry rather than a business judgment determination by the
board - which would unnecessarily complicate many important corporate transactions by
overemphasizing procedural aspects and increasing judicial involvement").
194. The effectiveness of independent directors has been the subject of intensive de-
bate. See Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95
HARv. L. REv. 597 (1982); Note, supra note 68.
195. Weiss, supra note 7, at 20-21 (arguing that objectivity is better determined by an
ability to make decisions absent influence by social and professional relationships, not by an
absence of pecuniary interest).
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cause shareholders generally acquiesce to management's desires. 196
In short, Professor Weiss asserts that the ALI test is too relaxed
and that courts should be allowed a much freer reign to inquire
into the substantive fairness of a conflict-of-interest transaction.
Similarly, Professor Scott states that standards for the duty of loy-
alty should be higher than current standards because the corporate
marketplace cannot adequately police duty of loyalty violations.
197
Thus, Part V of the ALI Principles has received criticism from
all sides. The Roundtable advocates less inquiry into the fairness
of the transaction, 98 while Professors Scott and Weiss argue that
heightened review is required. 199 Except for the proposal that inad-
equate disclosure by the interested director or officer should be a
breach of the duty of loyalty in itself, 00 however, Part V generally
is consistent with current judicial interpretations of most statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The American Law Institute has drafted a set of proposals
surrounded by controversy. While many of the proposals have a
basis in common law, the provisions that depart from current judi-
cial interpretations are particularly obtrusive. A major criticism of
the ALI Proposals is their failure to elicit input from experts in
other disciplines, such as business and economics. 10 Arguably, the
ALI should strive for the accuracy that distinguishes its restate-
ments and leave the evolution of corporate law to the judicial pro-
cess. The ALI's goals of clarification and presentation of the law in
a cohesive manner are commendable. The ALI Proposals, however,
will not be accepted universally as long as they propose a virtual
overhaul of the corporate structure with a systematic slant toward
increased liability for corporate directors and officers. Recent case
law clarifies, but does not markedly change, directors' and officers'
196. Id. Professor Weiss further suggests that the ALI Principles' disclosure provisions
will allow courts to manipulate facts in order to determine whether a director made "mate-
rial" disclosure.
197. Scott, supra note 7, at 938-39 (arguing that the derivative suit is the most effec-
tive means to prevent management from engaging in self-enriching transactions).
198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
201. See Roundtable Comments, supra note 7, at 5.
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duty of care and duty of loyalty. °2 Arguably the ALI should en-
gage in the same endeavor.
KATHRYN N. FINE
202. See supra Recent Developments (Special Project).
